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ANGOLA

Academic on Chemical 'Agents' Used in Conflict
MB2006104189 Windhoek THE WINDHOEK ADVERTISER
in English 16 Jun 89 p 1

[Report on "letter" by Prof A. Heyndrickx, director of the Department of Toxicology and Criminology at Rijks University, in Ghent, the Netherlands, to the U.S. Conservative Caucus, Inc., on the use of chemical "agents" in Angola's civil war—date of letter not given]

[Text] "You will find in my report the proof that those agents were used.

They are from Russian origin, used by the Cubans for the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] and in different regions of UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] people are attacked.

Special physicians are connected to my staff, experienced in chemical warfare since many years, also in the decontamination and treatment of patients.

—We have now a big problem that for some patients over there, with terrible secondary toxic effects with secondary pathological symptoms, we have no treatment and antidotes.

—Those patients suffer a lot, as you will see in my last report. Nobody takes care of them. I am sure that many die in remote villages, without any humanitarian aid.

We left a physical therapist, Miss Joelle Goire (26 years old) in Jamba, where she will work alone for 5 months, to try to rehabilitate some of them. The artificial limbs are made in a small workshop, using old car tires for the rubber, etc.

—From the analyses that we are doing at the moment in my laboratory of a Russian bomb used in a recent attack we are having 100 percent proof of the use of chemical warfare agents. We face again the big problem of decontamination and treatment of the patients.

As Dr Savimbi asked me for help which becomes very urgent in war, he realizes also that we could run in the catastrophe of the Middle East where Iraq used with massive doses a mixture of three very dangerous chemical warfare agents (mustard gas, cyanides and nerve gases), with a fatality of 60 percent. You will find it also in my report on Kurdistan.

In this case it will be impossible for Dr Savimbi to resist on the front, having no gasmasks, no protecting suits, no decontaminating agents and no pharmaceuticals for the treatment.

Due to the fact that in some cases it takes many weeks before we receive the samples from him for analysis, we were setting up in Jamba a small unit where my assistants were giving the elementary training to 5 technicians to do the screening for those agents and also the determination in blood and urine of patients, concerning those compounds.

Urgently we have to set up, on demand of Dr Savimbi, two units: One up North and one in the Cuito Cuanavale region, where those agents are used, to have the local investigation.

Enclosed I submit the list of the basic equipment to have scientific proof and also the basic pharmaceuticals for the treatment of the intoxicated. People of my Department, going over there, are doing it with their personal interest, on vacation leave, so that no salary has to be paid. The only problem is the airticket for the transport.

Those basic suggestions are very urgent, due to the attack at the moment with chemical warfare agents and the terrible situation of the patients we examined; also a child of 7 years old is irreversibly intoxicated.

I would appreciate if we could get in touch as soon and as much as possible."

—Prof Heyndrickx added the following list of essentials (totalling some R1-1/2m) and personnel urgently required:

—Automatic titrator, 2 waterbaths, glassware, chemicals, kit (screening detection wargases) 2 x, small equipment lab, 6 wheel chairs (for irreversible disabled patients by wargases).

—Pharmaceuticals (decontamination and treatment wargases),

Surgery room (hut); gas anesthesia equipment (amputation—mines).

—Personnel—Department of Toxicology. State University of Ghent. Specialized wargases mission of 14 days: 3 laboratory technicians, 2 assistants toxicology, 2 Physicians (surgeons, gas specialists—treatment) 1 professor, Air-transport, 3 Missions necessary.

—Mission to Belgium, University Hospitals Ghent—Intensive Care, specialized in treatment of patients wargases, 2 Physicians—Head Medical Services Angola (Dr Morgado—Dr Manassas).

SOUTH AFRICA

Academics Discuss 'Nuclear Option' for Missiles
MB2206111589 Johannesburg THE STAR in English
22 Jun 89 p 11

[By military correspondent Craig Kotze]

[Text] South Africa has the technology and capability to manufacture ballistic missiles, experts say. It is also widely believed that South Africa has the capability to make nuclear bombs.

But experts believe it would be counter-productive for South Africa to actually arm ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads, for both political and economic reasons.

Far better, they say, to arm a system such as the Jericho II with a conventional (explosives) warhead and to use it to fill the gaps in South Africa's Air Force armoury, such as the lack of heavy bombers.

Another reason which could spur South Africa to make such missiles would be to sell on the international arms market, where there is a huge demand for these deadly weapons and where Armscor [Armaments Corporation of South Africa] would find a ready market. Armscor is already far-advanced in missile technology.

The capabilities of long-range missiles, with conventional warheads, used by countries outside the super-power arena was graphically illustrated by the devastating "War of the Cities" between Iran and Iraq. Both sides bombarded cities with missiles similar to that South Africa and Israel are said to have made, shattering morale and bringing industry to a standstill. Missiles are relatively inexpensive and are extremely difficult to counter. The only adequate countermeasure would seem to be a missile armoury of your own.

"There is a great demand for these missiles in countries like Iran and Iraq. Someone may even have asked South Africa to develop such a missile for them.

"Possessing such a system would not necessarily mean it would be used exclusively by South Africa," said Professor Deon Fourie, Strategic Studies expert at the University of South Africa.

"Missiles could be used on enemy formations in the field. They are exceedingly difficult to counter. If loaded with conventional warheads, they could take the place of a heavy bomber force, which South Africa never developed.

"Bombers are difficult to protect and in South Africa's case such losses could not be afforded," he said.

The nuclear option for South African missiles would bear an extremely expensive political price-tag, especially in relations with relatively friendly countries such as Britain.

According to Professor Mike Hough of Pretoria University's Strategic Studies faculty, reports on South African/Israeli testing of a Jericho II version would rekindle the debate on whether South Africa has nuclear weapons or whether it intended signing the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty drawn up to curb their spread.

Says Professor Fourie: "The West is extremely frightened about the spread of nuclear weapons and an outbreak of nuclear war in smaller countries. One of the reasons is that no-one could be sure who was responsible for dropping nuclear bombs in such a war and accusations could be levelled at America and the Soviet Union.

"Should South Africa ever threaten to use such a weapon, countries such as Britain would immediately break off relations."

The American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has estimated that 15 developing countries will have ballistic missiles by the year 2000.

Professor Fourie said South Africa had no need for such nuclear weapons.

"What would we do with them? Eliminate Harare or use them against the ANC [African National Congress] inside South Africa? Far better to channel resources into conventional forces," he said.

**Soviet Principle of 'Reasonable Sufficiency'
Described as Parity**
40050555

[Editorial Report] Beijing SHIJIE ZHISHI [WORLD AFFAIRS] in Chinese No 9, of 1 May 1989 publishes on pages 9-10 an analytical piece by Zhou Aiqun on Gorbachev's principle of "reasonable sufficiency". The author's conclusion is that under the new principle, the Soviet Union will seek military parity with the United States and maintain military strength at the lowest possible, purely defensive level.

Comparing the principle of "reasonable sufficiency" with Soviet military policies of the past, Zhou Aiqun sees three differences:

1) "Reasonable sufficiency" is purely defensive in nature. Zhou notes that according to Soviet Defense Minister Yazov, "reasonable sufficiency" calls for military opponents of equal strength to pare down their military capabilities to a level at which each side has only defensive capability and no offensive capability.

2) "Reasonable sufficiency" calls for a low level of parity. The author notes that the history of the arms race has demonstrated that as soon as either the United States or the Soviet Union gains an advantage in a particular aspect, the other side will hurry to catch up. The result is that the arms race is always escalating and world peace and stability are seriously threatened. Under the principle of "reasonable sufficiency", the author notes that the Soviets still seek parity in military strength and capability but that they stress that parity should be attained at the lowest possible level.

3) "Reasonable sufficiency" is to be determined by a fairly flexible yardstick. While the author notes that the Soviet Union has yet to come up with a clear pronouncement on the concrete indicators of "reasonable sufficiency," he interpolates three ways in which it can be determined, based on the statements of Soviet military leaders and articles on the subject in Soviet periodicals. Zhou says that the main indicator would be the armaments and military activities of the other side. He cites Yazov's comments: "The degree of 'reasonable sufficiency' will be determined by the actions of the United States and NATO". "The Soviet Union does not seek military superiority; but it also will not allow anyone to gain superiority over it." A second determinant of "reasonable sufficiency," says the author, would be a country's military needs as determined by the international environment. One would have to look at how tense the international political and strategic situation was, the likelihood of military conflicts and wars of various magnitudes, and the degree of international and regional military threat posed by a potential invader. A third determinant, says Zhou, would be the degree to which a

country's economy can bear the defense burden; in other words, how far a country's economy can satisfy national defense needs without hurting overall national economic growth.

The author warns that the principle of "reasonable sufficiency" by no means signifies that the Soviet Union will abandon its emphasis on military strength or neglect the construction and development of its military forces. Zhou points out that on the contrary, Gorbachev has clearly indicated that "the party has not for a minute slackened its efforts to continue to strengthen the military forces" and that the major objective of Soviet national defense from now on is to ensure the quality of its military forces through scientific and technological improvements. Thus, says Zhou, we can expect that the Soviet Union will continue to maintain a military strength capable of countering a NATO offensive and commensurate with its economic strength and status as a superpower.

According to the author, the Soviets are now acting in accordance with the principle of "reasonable sufficiency" as manifested in two ways:

1) The Soviets are reducing the quantity of their military forces. Zhou cites Gorbachev's 7 December announcement at the UN General Assembly that the Soviet Union will unilaterally reduce its conventional forces in Eastern Europe within 2 years and the February announcement by a Soviet arms control negotiator that the Soviet Union will reduce its short-range missiles from 1,600 to 88 to equal the number deployed by the West.

2) The Soviets are improving the quality of their military forces. This is to ensure their readiness for combat although the forces are being reduced overall. The author observes that they are doing this by: increasing research in military S&T, developing a wide variety of new weapons, and perfecting the C₃I system; trying to make the ranks of the military leadership younger, more knowledgeable, and more expert; reorganizing the composition of their troops so that they will be smaller, more diversified, and more versatile in their assignments; and improving their training techniques and their preparedness for combat.

Zhou sees three constraints on the Soviets in implementing "reasonable sufficiency." The first is the United States. A second constraint is that Soviet military forces internally disagree on the theory of "reasonable sufficiency" and some elements even oppose the idea. A third constraint, says Zhou, is that it will not be easy to fundamentally change a military policy that has for years emphasized enormous conventional forces and an offensive strategy. Finally, the author points out that many military officers are worried that drastic cuts in military personnel will threaten their own personal benefits as well as the perks that the military forces have traditionally enjoyed; thus many are unhappy with the idea and put up passive resistance.

LIAOWANG Account of Bush's Post-NATO Meeting Visit to Bonn
HK1706091189 Hong Kong LIAOWANG OVERSEAS EDITION in Chinese No 24, 12 Jun 89 pp 28-29

[Article by Hu Yongzhen: "Bush Visits Bonn To Remove Any Shadow"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] Bush arrived in the FRG in the wake of the NATO summit at which an accord was reached on short-range missiles. There had been endless disputes within the Western alliance since the initialling of the U.S.-Soviet intermediate-range guided missile treaty in December 1988. Especially over the past month or so, the dispute over short-range missiles between the United States and the FRG became all the more acute; consequently, intense quarrels surfaced, with the FRG representing some West European countries on the one side, and the United States and the United Kingdom, along with some other West European countries, on the other. The recent dispute had as its root cause the practical interests of each side. It reflected different perspectives inside the alliance on the changed East-West relations, as well as differences on how to make NATO's traditional strategy suit the new reality. Their disputes focused on when to hold short-range missile talks, but the substance lay in whether short-range missiles would continue to play the role of a deterrent.

Bush's proposal on accelerating conventional disarmament talks at the NATO summit has made possible the unanimity of both sides to the dispute. According to Bush's proposal, East and West would reach an accord on conventional disarmament, begin its implementation, and short-range missile talks would then begin. Apparently, all sides concerned were quite satisfied with the solution. [passage omitted]

The fact that Bush arranged his visit to Bonn right after the NATO summit and prior to Gorbachev's visit to the same country reflects U.S. interest in the situation of changed East-West relations in Europe; U.S. diplomatic thinking by which the United States has changed from passivity to taking the initiative in facing the continuous Soviet peace offensives; and that the U.S. is trying to prevent a disjunction between the FRG and trying to promote further change in the USSR and Eastern Europe. At the same time, it also reflects the fact that the FRG has its roots in the Western alliance. The FRG will continue to rely on the U.S. "umbrella," and to actively take advantage of the "historical opportunity" provided by the reform in the USSR and Eastern Europe to "develop its relations with the USSR and Eastern Europe" in all areas. Furthermore, it is also the strategic thinking of the FRG to create conditions for settling its own problems. However, the 40-year history of NATO tells us that while the major NATO member nations share common interests, each has its own national interests, and German-U.S. relations from now on will not be all easy sailing. Even when the decision on short-range missiles is postponed to 1992, will a new dispute have

occurred by then? Will Bush's timetable, which is wishful thinking, for reaching an accord on conventional disarmament within 6 months or a year be fulfilled, thus paving the way for short-range guided missile talks? Will the FRG's concern over the situation in Eastern Europe and its expectations regarding its own national issues be understood by the other aligned nations? All these are questions facing the alliance. In the 40 years of postwar development, the cold war situation is coming to an end. The changes in the postwar order not only involve East-West relations, but also touch on the internal relations of the Western alliance. With the threat from the East being phased out, and the strengthening of the allied nations' sense of taking the initiative into their own hands, the rallying force inside the alliance has been weakened. Therefore, it is unlikely that contradictions within the Western alliance, especially between the United States and the FRG, will be prevented. An article in the FRG's GENERALANZEIGER pointed out that there are many things waiting to be accomplished by the FRG and the United States, and that it is primarily necessary to strengthen dialogue "to clarify misunderstanding and to work hard to build faith in each other," "before the broken piece of china can be mended." Bush's visit to Bonn can be said to be an initial effort in this aspect.

New Round of U.S.-Soviet Nuclear, Space Arms Talks Viewed
HK2606072389 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese 21 Jun 89 p 3

[("Roundup" by staff reporter Zhang Qixin: "A New Round of U.S.-Soviet Nuclear Disarmament Talks Begins")]

[Text] Washington, 18 Jun—After 7 months' adjournment, the U.S.-Soviet talks on reducing nuclear and space weapons will resume in Geneva on 19 June. According to the negotiations process, the main subject of the talks in the next round will be the drafting of a treaty between the two sides to reduce 50 percent of their respective strategic arsenals. The two sides have discussed this proposed treaty for a long time, but they have not yet reached agreement on many issues. According to the present situation, it does not seem that agreement on all of these issues can be reached very soon.

The talks on strategic weapons constitute an important component of U.S.-Soviet negotiations in the package disarmament plan for reducing nuclear and space weapons. These talks are now entering their fifth year. Since the two sides began these talks in 1985, the talks have undergone many twists and turns. However, major progress has been made since the U.S.-Soviet summit meeting in Iceland in October 1986, where the two leaders agreed to reduce by 50 percent their respective offensive strategic weapons. The outline of the treaty on reducing strategic weapons has been largely drawn up, and the main points are as follows: Both sides have agreed that the number of the existing strategic arms

carriers (including land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and long-distance strategic bombers) be reduced to 1,600, and that the number of nuclear warheads for various strategic weapons be reduced to 6,000. Under this premise, both sides have also agreed that the number of warheads carried by intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles be limited to 4,900, and that the number of heavy warheads be limited to 1,540. Both sides have also agreed that three documents for verifying the strategic weapons be formulated on the basis of the verification principles included in the INF treaty signed in December 1987. The above points formed merely the initial agreement, because many relevant issues still have to be solved through further negotiations. It is against this background that the negotiating representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union will resume their work in Geneva on 19 June.

After the United States and Soviet Union begin this new round of nuclear disarmament talks, they will face two major tasks: First, to seek solutions for the remaining differences; and second, to handle any new problems that may occur in the process of negotiations. The remaining differences are basically concentrated in three aspects: First, what restrictions are to be imposed on the three categories of strategic weapons? At present, the structures of strategic weapons on the two sides are different. The Soviet Union's superiority lies in land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, while the United States has the upper hand in naval and air nuclear forces. Therefore, the United States has demanded in negotiations that more restrictions be imposed on land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, especially the heavy and mobile missiles possessed by the Soviet Union. When Reagan was in power, aside from setting a limit to the number of warheads carried by land-based missiles, the United States also demanded that SS-24 and SS-25 missiles, the two types of mobile missiles that the Soviet Union deploy, be banned. This was rejected by the Soviet Union. At present, the Bush administration has decided to develop two types of mobile missiles, the MX and the Minuteman. However, the U.S. Congress has not approved the relevant appropriation and has not shown a clear attitude toward this plan, so it is still unclear whether the United States will change its position on banning mobile missiles. On the

other hand, the Soviet Union has demanded that the naval and air nuclear forces of the United States be limited and that the number of cruise missiles carried by bombers and submarines also be limited. This demand has not been accepted by the United States. The second unsettled issue is verification. The verification of strategic weapons is much more complicated than the verification of medium-range missiles, and many details in the plan for verification have not been determined. Now the United States intends to put forward a new proposal on verification. It proposes that after the treaty is drafted, the two sides begin some test verification projects so as to ensure the reliability of the verification measures. Some people here are worried that this may complicate and prolong the negotiations to an undesirable extent. The third issue is the relationship between the strategic arms treaty and the observance of the antimissile treaty; this in fact represents the fundamental differences between the two sides on the issue of strategic defense, over which the two sides have argued unceasingly for a long time. At present, the United States still stresses that it will continue to study and deploy a "more comprehensive defense system." It seems that differences in this respect will continue to exist.

Since the Bush administration came to power, it has comprehensively reviewed the process of the nuclear disarmament talks, but at present, the U.S. Congress has not yet made any clear decision on various key issues of the strategic weapons treaty. It is said that the United States wants to see what new proposal the Soviet Union puts forward before it decides to take any new step. Not long ago, at the NATO summit meeting, President Bush said that he wanted to speed up the process of the conventional force talks and strive to reach an agreement in one year's time. However, he has not expressed a clear attitude toward the nuclear arms talks. The press here has said that the United States may now try to focus its efforts on reaching an agreement on conventional forces first and is not anxious to conclude a nuclear arms treaty. The new administration in the United States has once again indicated that it does not intend to radically change the original framework for the strategic arms treaty, but has stressed that some major revisions may be made. Therefore, some people expect that the new round of U.S.-Soviet nuclear disarmament talks is not likely to achieve results in as short a time as had been expected.

FIJI

Antinuclear Group Protests U.S. Naval Ship's Visit

BK2806091589 Melbourne Overseas Service in English 0500 GMT 28 Jun 89

[Text] A Fiji antinuclear group says the American naval frigate the "Robert E. Peary" has become the first nuclear-capable vessel to enter a Fijian port since the two military coups in 1987.

Radio Australia's South Pacific correspondent, Jemima Gareth, says the "Robert E. Peary" arrived in Suva this morning on a 3-day goodwill visit.

A spokesman for the American Embassy in Suva said the frigate was in Fiji to deliver a 9-meter research vessel being donated to the University of the South Pacific by the United States Navy.

The spokesperson for the Fiji antinuclear group says his organization is extremely disturbed by the warship's visit. He said it was being used as a pretext to open Fiji's ports to nuclear-powered and -armed vessels and to move away from the former elected government's commitment to keep Fiji nuclear-free.

The spokesperson said that by allowing nuclear ship visits, the interim government was drawing the super-power rivalry into the South Pacific.

Jemima Gareth said the spokesperson for the American Embassy said that in the usual naval policy, he could neither confirm nor deny whether "Robert E. Peary" was nuclear-capable.

INDONESIA

Foreign Minister Alatas on Soviet Invitation To View Naval Exercises

BK2906141089 Hong Kong AFP in English 1348 GMT 29 Jun 89

[Text] Jakarta, June 29 (AFP)—Foreign Minister Ali Alatas confirmed here Thursday that the Soviet Union had invited Indonesia to send observers to a naval exercise in the Sea of Japan next month.

"The invitation is being processed," Mr Alatas said at a press conference, adding, "there has been no decision yet."

Mr Alatas said a similar invitation had been sent to all members of the noncommunist Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)—Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.

The minister said he had no details of what their reply to the invitation had been, adding that he attached no particular importance to the move.

"It is just part of 'glasnost' in the Asia-Pacific region," Mr Alatas said, referring to Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's policy of openness.

News of the invitation first surfaced here last week in a published interview with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Rogachev, who described the invitation as a way of further strengthening bilateral relations.

Moscow was Indonesia's largest supplier of arms and aid in the 1950s and 1960s but has kept a very low profile here since the staunchly anticommunist President Suharto came to power in the aftermath of an abortive communist coup attempt in 1965.

Mr Alatas, replying to a question, said the two sides were still trying to find a date for Mr Suharto to make his first ever visit to Moscow. The president was originally to have gone in June but put off the trip when the Soviet authorities said Mr Gorbachev would only be able to receive him in July.

NEW ZEALAND

Prime Minister Lange on U.S. Aides' Refusal To Meet Over Ships Policy

Comments on Cheney's 'Gaffe'

BK2606071289 Hong Kong AFP in English 0641 GMT 26 Jun 89

[Text] Wellington, June 26 (AFP)—Prime Minister David Lange praised United States Defence Secretary Dick Cheney here Monday as a "a commonsense person" after an embarrassing gaffe by the U.S. official over the nuclear ships ban issue at the weekend.

In an interview shown on Australian television Sunday, Mr. Cheney said he was happy to see any New Zealand Government minister who asked him for a meeting, despite his country's objection to New Zealand's ban on nuclear armed and powered ships.

But he was quickly contradicted by Pentagon officials who said the ban on talks which has existed since 1986 would remain as long as New Zealand maintained its current position on visits by American ships.

Mr. Lange told a press conference Monday that he believed Mr. Cheney was "basically a straightforward, commonsense person whose instinctive reaction was to say 'of course we'll talk to them.'

"Unhappily, officials within the Department of Defence in the U.S. quickly put the kibosh on that and said that their boss wasn't allowed to speak. I'm a bit lost about it: the head guy says 'charge' and his lieutenants say 'dive'."

Mr. Lange said Mr. Cheney's remarks had probably been untutored and were a basically sensible response to the issue, unhindered by "the baggage of the past."

Mr. Lange said he would welcome the opportunity to talk with Mr. Cheney or other U.S. officials about New Zealand's position, because he believed there were misconceptions about it in the United States.

He said he hoped some good would come from Mr. Cheney's remarks, because he would probably be asking "why chaps down the road told me I was off my head when I said that."

Mr. Lange said the American ban was still very much in place because U.S. Secretary of State James Baker had refused to have talks with New Zealand's Foreign Minister Russell Marshall when the pair are in Brunei later this week.

They are attending a post-ASEAN forum which will bring together members and nonmembers of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations after an ASEAN ministerial meeting.

Says Baker Rejected Talks

BK2606080489 Melbourne Overseas Service in English
0500 GMT 26 Jun 89

[Text] New Zealand's prime minister, Mr Lange, says the American secretary of state, Mr Baker, has refused to meet his New Zealand counterpart, Mr Marshall. Speaking in a radio interview, Mr Lange said Mr Marshall had asked to meet Mr Baker while the two men were in Brunei later this week. However, he said the request had been rejected because of New Zealand's ban on port visits by nuclear-armed or nuclear-powered warships.

Mr Lange said the United States was prepared to meet the deputy leader of the opposition in New Zealand, Mr Don McKinnon, but was not prepared to speak to a government representative. The prime minister was referring to a meeting in Washington in April between Mr McKinnon and the American defense secretary, Mr Cheney.

The Defense Secretary said yesterday in an Australian television interview that he was prepared to meet any senior New Zealand Government minister. However, the New Zealand Press Association says officials in Mr Chaney's department immediately contradicted him, saying the ban on talks would remain as long as New Zealand's ban on nuclear-capable ships.

PHILIPPINES

Further on Controversy over U.S. Bases, Nuclear Missiles

Congress Seeks Help To Clarify Nuclear Presence
HK2706072889 Manila PHILIPPINE DAILY
GLOBE in English 27 Jun 89 p 8

[By staff writer Rowena Bundang]

[Text] A Bipartisan group of congressmen sought yesterday the help of neutral countries with known nuclear

technology capabilities to check whether the U.S. military bases here keep nuclear weapons.

In a resolution, the congressmen led by Rep. Ciriaco Alfelor (LP [Liberal Party], Camarines Sur), said enlisting the help of these countries would once and for all determine whether the U.S. has been following the constitutional ban on the storage of nuclear weapons in the country.

The authors were confident that U.S. authorities won't hold the resolution against the Filipino people who have a covenant to defend and uphold the integrity of the Constitution.

The congressmen said the proposal would also benefit the Americans since it would erase world perception that the U.S. is hoodwinking Filipinos on the nuclear weapons issue.

The resolution, proposed that the Philippine government would immediately ask neutral countries with nuclear technology capabilities to send experts to help the government detect the presence of nuclear weapons in U.S. military bases.

Among the countries being eyed for help are India, Switzerland and Belgium.

The proposed inspection team will be furnished with the structural map of the U.S. bases complex. They will be accompanied by representative from executive, legislative, judiciary branches of government in the conduct of the inspection.

'Silent Majority' Said To Accept Bases

HK2806084789 Manila MANILA BULLETIN
in English 27 Jun 89 p 6

[From column by Jesus Bigornia: "For Better or for Worse, Bases Staying"]

[Text] For better or for worse, the United States military bases are here to stay. Neither raucous demonstrations, including one with international flavor, nor debates in Congress or on television have triggered a wave of anti-bases hysteria as the country's self-proclaimed nationalists had predicted. The man in the street, the farmer in the field, the shopkeeper in his store, even the housewife in the kitchen, all seem to have accepted the American military presence as a settled issue.

Early on in the Aquino administration, the continued stay and operation of Clark airbase in Pampanga and Subic naval facility in Zambales gained some public notice, fueled by the so-called "cause-oriented" groups. For a while, it was fashionable to cry: Out with the bases. Anti-Americanism gained some currency. But the crusade crashed when it became clear to the public that the protest was fueled by the country's "Left." Fear of a communist takeover had set in.

Increasingly, the previously silent majority is speaking out against the most dangerous threat to national security. Revulsion to assassination of law enforcement officers has speeded alienation of the people from the "revolutionary Left." It is now evident that while almost all Filipinos desire the dismantling of Clark and Subic eventually, only a minority is clamoring for their immediate removal. Most perceive the continued stay of the bases as a bastion against any continued communist threat.

The nation's perceived "drift" toward awareness of, and opposition to, the communist threat will be dissected in a public debate scheduled for July 7 in Catbalogan, in the heart of rebel-infested Samar. There, some 4,000 students from the colleges and universities of eastern Visayas will witness a discussion of the rebellion now inflaming the countryside and its impact on the American presence in Philippines. The project is the brainchild of Samar Rep. Jose A. Rono. Featured as the principal speaker is Senate Minority Leader Juan Ponce Enrile.

Ramos: Military Free To Search Bases
*HK3006091989 Manila THE MANILA CHRONICLE
in English 28 Jun 89 p 9*

[Text] Defense Secretary Fidel V. Ramos said Monday Filipino military commanders in Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base have complete access to "every nook and corner" inside the two large American military installations even as he played down nuclear threats posed by the presence of these bases.

Ramos said he has yet to receive formal reports on the presence of nuclear weapons inside Clark Air Base [CAB] in Pampanga and Subic Naval Base in Zambales from the Filipino military commanders there.

He said the Filipino military commanders "were trained and qualified to determine nuclear weapons" if there were any inside U.S. bases in the country.

Ramos was referring to Air Force Brig. Gen. Demetrio Camua Jr., CAB Filipino deputy commander, who studied and trained for two years at West Germany's War College and Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC).

During a visit to Clark last week, Camua said he had seen and touched nuclear weapons, like the Pershing and Hercules missiles.

He had also familiarized himself with both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons used by the Allied countries in West Germany and observed the safety precautions in handling these weapons.

Ramos said Filipino and American military commanders sitting as members of the RP [Republic of the Philippines]-U.S. Mutual Defense Board (MDB) have been discussing issues concerning base security and perimeter defense, access to "restricted" U.S. facilities

inside the bases, and other issues concerning external security and national interests.

He said the mechanics on the inspection of U.S. bases to find out if there are nuclear weapons could be taken up by the MDB, jointly headed by the AFP [Armed Forces of the Philippines] chief of Staff and the U.S. Commander-in-chief of the Pacific Forces (MDB, Cincpac).

But Ramos played down threats posed by the presence of U.S. bases here. He said recent developments worldwide, particularly in the East Asia and Pacific region, have reduced tensions among rival superpowers.

As tensions worldwide were greatly defused following peace initiatives by both the communist bloc and the pro-democracy Western countries, threats of nuclear war among superpowers have also been reduced, Ramos said.

There has been a seeming stalemate in Europe as the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact moved to reduce conventional forces and nuclear arms in the region.

Despite U.S. objections, West Germany and other North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Nato) member-countries have also called for arms reduction, particularly medium-range missiles in western Europe.

Soviet troops and tanks moved out from East Germany and Czechoslovakia two months ago. The Soviets have also pulled out from Afghanistan as they moved to cut down on military spendings and rebuild their economy.

In East Asia and Pacific region, the Soviets have also renewed their friendly relations with communist China and called for U.S. pullout in the Philippines in exchange for Soviet withdrawal in Vietnam.

"These events have contributed much in making the region more peaceful and stable," Ramos said, adding that the Government must direct all its efforts first on solving the insurgency problem and improving the economy before worrying much on developments outside.

Ramos said insurgency and collapse of the economy are the most potent threat facing the Government. On the scale of one to 10, he said these two problems would get full 10 points.

He gave nine points to the threats poised by a nuclear attack on U.S. military facilities here. He added that there were other more strategic U.S. bases in the region which would draw more attacks than the bases here.

Besides, U.S. authorities have slowly started to move out of the country as the fate of the two U.S. facilities here after 1991 remained uncertain. Early this month, the commander and staff of the U.S. 7th Fleet moved to Japan.

The Clark-based 374th U.S. Air Force Tactical Airlift Wing and its squadron of C-130 transport aircraft have

also moved to Guam and Japan, leaving behind a handful of aircraft maintenance personnel.

CZECHOSLAVAKIA

Jakes Report to 14th Central Committee Plenum
AU2206060189 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech
15 Jun 89 pp 3-4

[“Report on the Activity of the CPCZ after the 13th Session of the CPCZ Central Committee and its Further Tasks,” delivered by Milos Jakes, general secretary of the CPCZ Central Committee, on the opening day of the 14th Session of the CPCZ Central Committee in Prague on 14 June]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted]

Concerning Our Foreign Policy Endeavors

Comrades, having as our point of departure a joint interest in strengthening socialism and peace, we paid great attention in the past period to the development of cooperation with fraternal communist and workers parties of the socialist countries and other states. Serving this aim were the meetings between the general secretary of the CPCZ Central Committee and their leading representatives. [passage omitted]

Czechoslovakia was visited by a number of representatives of communist and workers parties—by the general secretary of the Communist Party of Norway, by the general secretary of the AKEL party from Cyprus, and by other party, state, and government representatives from socialist and nonsocialist countries. [passage omitted]

During all meetings, we expressed on our part our full readiness to continue, together with the Soviet Union and other socialist states and peace-loving forces, to take an active part in the spirit of the new political thinking, in the process of disarmament, the development of European cooperation and the creation of a comprehensive system of international peace and security. [passage omitted]

Questions of European security and cooperation have an important place in our foreign political effort. The conclusions of the Vienna follow-up meeting became a significant impulse for further developing the European process. In harmony with our democratic legal order, we responsibly approach their fulfillment. In this spirit, we participated in the preparation and proceedings of the recently ended London information forum and the Paris conference on the human dimension that is now taking place.

We give exceptional attention to the military political aspects of European security. In doing this, our point of departure is our own historic experience, the geographic position of Czechoslovakia, and the conviction that only by way of political and military detente can we strengthen peace, develop mutually beneficial cooperation, and solve global problems. Our initiatives are aimed at establishing a zone of trust on the line of

contact between the states of the Warsaw Pact and NATO, as well as joint proposals by the CPCZ, the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, and the Socialist Democratic Party of Germany to set up a corridor free of nuclear and chemical weapons.

We are actively approaching negotiations on conventional armed forces in Europe between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, toward deliberations among the 35 member states of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and measures to strengthen security and trust. Evidence of this are our unilateral disarmament measures and a proposal by the Warsaw Pact to open negotiations on reducing the stocks of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. A significant problem is presented by the attitudes of some political circles in the West, particularly their effort to modernize tactical nuclear weapons and an unwillingness to scrap short-range missiles.

The member states of the Warsaw Pact recently asked the NATO countries to consider new realities in the world and to use new possibilities for successfully overcoming the consequences of the cold war. The appeal suggests unilaterally disbanding both military political blocks, and as a first step for achieving this aim, to disband their military organizations. I think that the negotiations which are now being conducted by Comrade Gorbachev in the FRG are contributing to these aims. [passage omitted]

NATO Called ‘Reluctant’ To Reduce Aircraft
AU1306133489 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech
9 Jun 89 p 1

[CTK report: “Disagreements About Aircraft”]

[Text] Vienna—The CTK Vienna correspondent asked Ladislav Balcar, head of the CSSR delegation to CFE talks, to evaluate the current situation in the negotiations between Warsaw Pact and NATO member states on the reduction of conventional forces in Europe.

Much joint effort will still be necessary for both the Warsaw Pact states and the NATO states to find a common denominator. This is evident in the problem of aircraft. Unlike before, the NATO countries are willing to include aircraft in the agreement. The question arises about what kind of aircraft to include in the number which would be subject to reduction. The Warsaw Pact countries are of the opinion that this should involve, first and foremost, strike aircraft of the tactical air force. In this sphere, the NATO countries have the advantage and are reluctant to agree to such a method of including aircraft earmarked for reduction. They want to resolve this situation by incorporating into this number aircraft which only fulfill tasks of antiaircraft defense. The Warsaw Pact member states are not ruling this out because they assume that a reduction in aircraft of this

type should take place in the second stage. In the first stage, those types of aircraft which have a fundamental destabilizing character should be reduced.

We hope, he said, that before 7 September, when the third round of negotiations begins, we will find a response even to this question in the NATO proposals.

Canadians Observe CSSR Military Exercises Under CDE Final Document

AU2006172689 Bratislava *PRAVDA in Slovak*
15 Jun 89 p 2

[CTK report]

[Text] Podborany—In Karlovy Vary at 1230 yesterday, a group of four Canadian inspectors began the first inspection of military activity on CSSR territory. The right to request the carrying out of an inspection arises from Articles 65 and 66 of the Final Document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence-Building Measures, Security, and Disarmament in Europe.

The inspection can last for a maximum of 48 hours, that is, it must be completed by 1230 on Friday 16 June. The Czechoslovak side is obliged to create for the inspectors all the conditions for their work, to provide transportation, to place at their disposal the necessary means of transportation, including helicopters, and enable them to carry out inspection activity on territory which the side making the request determines beforehand. This case involves territory from the east right up to the south-west of Bohemia.

The inspection on the basis of the Stockholm document is being undertaken in Czechoslovakia for the first time, and Canada is also carrying out an inspection in another country for the first time. The CSSR was the last state in Central Europe where such an inspection had not taken place so far.

Shortly before the inspectors' departure for the military area in north-western Bohemia, where tactical exercises by a Czechoslovak People's Army unit involving 13,500 troops are currently taking place, the commander of the Canadian group of military experts, Colonel Ken Mitchell, granted an interview to a CTK reporter. In the interview, he said that he is very satisfied with the cooperation from the Czechoslovak side. The mission of the inspection, he said, arises wholly from the conclusions of the Stockholm conference. He expressed his conviction that such inspections contribute to increasing trust and security in Europe. In reply to the question of whether the Canadian Government had some special reason for delegating an inspection to the CSSR, Colonel Mitchell said: "There was no special reason, but we regarded it as suitable to utilize the opportunity and valid stipulations of the Stockholm document."

International Militaries Visit South Moravia

43-Member Group Makes Visit

LD1706141289 Prague *Domestic Service in Czech*
1000 GMT 17 Jun 89

[Text] A 43-member group of military experts from 27 countries—including the United States of America and Canada—is visiting the South Moravian region at the invitation of the Defense Ministry. They include members of Vienna talks on measures to strengthen trust and security in Europe, as well as talks of the 23 states of the Warsaw Pact and NATO on conventional disarmament in Europe.

Further Report

AU2006154589 Bratislava *PRAVDA in Slovak*
19 Jun 89 p 1

[CTK report: "In Support of Trust Between States; Military Experts From the Vienna Talks in South Moravia"]

[Text] Brno—On Saturday [17 June], 43 military experts from 27 European countries, the United States, and Canada, visited the South Moravia region at the invitation of the CSSR minister for national defense. They were representatives from both sets of Vienna talks: on confidence-building measures and security, in which representatives from 35 countries are participating, and representatives at the talks between the 23 states of the Warsaw Pact and NATO on conventional armed forces in Europe.

In 1987 Czechoslovakia, as the first country after the Stockholm Conference on security and cooperation in Europe, invited foreign experts to observe military activity in the CSSR. The visit to the South Moravia region is the first invitation extended to military representatives of the current Vienna talks, with the aim of opening the doors of military glasnost, and of supporting trust between states in order that the discussions between the experts finish as soon as possible, with positive results.

The foreign guests observed with interest the battlefield of three emperors in 1805 at Slavkov near Brno (abroad it is known as the Battle of Austerlitz). At the Zuran section, they were given a lecture on Napoleon I's waging of the battle. At the Tumulus of Peace monument in the village of Prace, they became acquainted with the consequences of the several-hour-long battle involving 65,000 Frenchmen with 80,000 men from the allied Austro-Russian forces, the outcome of which was 35,000 dead. At Slavkov Castle, their attention was attracted to the place where the rulers signed the peace treaty.

At Brno-Turany Airport, the experts viewed air and ground-based weapons and systems which are the subject of the present talks in Vienna.

6 July 1989

During a visit to the first faculty of the Antonin Zapotocky Military Academy in Brno, they were convinced about the defensive military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact countries and the CSSR. In this oldest and largest military college in Czechoslovakia, they inspected training facilities and conversed with the head of the academy on the preparation of command cadres for the Czechoslovak People's Army. Here they also saw an exhibition of modern Czechoslovak hunting and sporting weapons.

In the evening the military experts returned to Vienna.

Soviet Engineer Battalion Completes Withdrawal

*LD2406223589 Prague International Service in English
1900 GMT 24 Jun 89*

[Text] The fifth and last shipment of Soviet engineering troops has left the town of Olomouc in central Czechoslovakia. This completes the pull-out of one Soviet Army battalion. The troops are being redispersed to positions in Soviet Belorussia. Under an inter-government agreement reached between Moscow and Prague, a total of 1,500 Soviet troops are to be withdrawn from Czechoslovakia this year, together with 192 tanks and 20 combat aircraft. Thus far, two Soviet battalions have left the Olomouc area.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Chief Delegate to CFE Talks 'Expects Early Agreements'

*AU2006121989 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 16 Jun 89 p 5*

[ADN report: "Vienna Talks: GDR Expects Early and Substantive Agreements"]

[Text] Vienna—In the GDR's view, the Vienna talks on conventional disarmament in Europe succeeded, in a relatively short time, in narrowing the differences between the positions of the Warsaw Pact and NATO. The package of proposals submitted by the socialist states and the corresponding reaction by the NATO summit in Brussels testify to this, the head of the GDR delegation, Ambassador Klaus-Dieter Ernst stated on Thursday [15 June] at the plenary session in Vienna. The GDR advocates the early conclusion of substantial and reliable agreements that strengthen the security and stability in Europe to the advantage of all sides concerned.

Ambassador Ernst expressed the hope that the general willingness of the Western side to include attack aircraft, helicopters, and manpower in the talks will soon translate into corresponding specific proposals. As soon as the NATO proposals are on the table, they will be closely examined by the Warsaw Pact, with readiness for compromise.

The GDR representative also referred to the proposal made by the Brussels NATO summit to reduce only Soviet and U.S. manpower stationed abroad. He described such an approach as unilateral, because this would mean that about 150,000 soldiers from other NATO states that are deployed outside their territories would not be taken into consideration. This would make it possible, for example, to compensate the reductions and ceilings through armed forces of other states of the alliance. Since a large number of these soldiers are stationed on the GDR's western border, the GDR is highly interested in a reliable settlement of this problem, Ambassador Ernst stressed. For this reason, the socialist states have proposed joint limits to the strength of all troops deployed abroad, he pointed out.

Delegation Head at Geneva Disarmament Conference Comments

*LD2006135389 East Berlin ADN International Service
in German 0934 GMT 20 Jun 89*

[Text] Geneva (ADN)—Ambassador Dr Peter Dietze, head of the GDR delegation at the Geneva Disarmament Conference, appealed to the body of 44 states "to make a firm contribution toward the brisk continuation of the process of disarmament, which has been set in motion." The GDR is in favor of the conference holding an exchange of views, based on results so far, to proceed to negotiations in areas where this is possible, and to bring current negotiations to an early conclusion, he told the plenary session today.

Regarding talks on banning chemical weapons, the conference must now concentrate on drawing up regulations on checks where there is ground for suspicion, as well as on agreeing on the procedural order for destroying chemical weapons and their production plants. The GDR is ready to do everything within its power to solve these problems.

Improved political conditions should make it easier for the conference to make advances, at last in nuclear disarmament. The proposals submitted by the Soviet Union in 1986 and India in 1988 on the gradual elimination of nuclear weapons, the socialist states' working paper on nuclear disarmament presented in New York this May, and the corresponding resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly offered a good basis for this. A ban on nuclear weapons testing would, above all else, be the key to limiting the nuclear arms race.

The conference must also help work out the principles of nuclear disarmament. This included the interrelations between bilateral and multilateral agreements, the connection between nuclear disarmament, and other areas of disarmament or parallel measures, such as the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from foreign territories and security guarantees for states which do not possess nuclear weapons.

Regarding the question of "preventing an arms race in space," more concrete work must be done. The head of the GDR delegation renewed his call in this respect for a ban on antisatellite and other space weapons.

Editorial Criticizes NATO Nuclear Modernization
AU2806185089 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 27 Jun 89 p 2

[“W.M.” editorial: “He Who Wants To Keep the Hellish Nuclear Devices Is Cheating”]

[Text] We want peace and security for us and all other peoples of our continent. As again stated at the eighth session of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany [SED] Central Committee, the prerequisite for this is a major reduction in the level of military balance to achieve mutual inability to attack. That is to say, armed forces and armaments between the Atlantic and the Urals have to be reduced to such an extent that they suffice for adequately defending one's own territory, but not for carrying out surprise attacks or large-scale offensive actions.

In the Vienna negotiations, by presenting offers of ceilings to be agreed upon, the Warsaw Pact states showed what this concretely means. In accordance with our military doctrine aimed at defense, we propose to reduce land and offensive air forces to 1,350,000 men each on both sides in Europe, the number of offensive aircraft to 1,500, of attack helicopters to 1,700, of tanks to 20,000, of armored combat vehicles to 28,000, and of artillery systems to 28,000. The figures are detailed for central Europe, the zone of contact between the military pacts, and the rear zones. Our proposal contains ceilings for armed forces and armaments of the individual states and for soldiers and weapons deployed outside their national borders.

Experts largely agree that such reductions would produce the desired inability to attack in the field of conventional armaments. But what about other armaments, above all tactical nuclear weapons? If they were maintained in parallel to conventional disarmament, the danger of a surprise attack and a nuclear conflict would not be eliminated.

Thus, the Vienna talks on conventional armed forces and armaments have to be complemented by parallel negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons as soon as possible. However, this is precisely what NATO rejected. At the earliest, it will be prepared to discuss these questions if agreements in the conventional sector are being implemented. And it definitely does not want to agree to a third zero solution.

What is more: The latest NATO meeting in Brussels established the hackneyed legend of the “threat from the East,” the accused “policy of strength,” the clinging to the strategy of the so-called nuclear deterrence, and the project of “modernizing” the short-range nuclear missiles which are primarily deployed in the FRG and the range of which is to be extended to almost 500 km. All

this means that the West wants to preserve its ability to attack, its ability to carry out a nuclear first strike under any circumstances.

Things are clear: He who postpones negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons and thwarts a third zero solution is cheating. Four out of five FRG citizens want nuclear weapons to be eliminated because they do not provide security, but will make them the first victims of a nuclear inferno in case of war. Yet the government, which knows this very well, is acting quite contrary. It has actually given up its original demand for early negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons and is putting it off until later. However, readiness for peace is not shown by statements on distant times, but by taking action today to eliminate the hellish devices.

Nuclear-Free Zones Meeting Opens in Berlin

International Liaison Office for NFZs
LD2706154189 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 0917 GMT 27 Jun 89

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—A 2-day meeting of the International Liaison Office for Nuclear-Free Zones [NFZs] began in Berlin on Tuesday morning. It is being attended by representatives of governments and parliaments, parties, and international organizations, and by personalities from organizations of nuclear-free zones and cities, from peace movements and scientific institutions.

“One year after the international meeting on nuclear-free zones in Berlin, which turned out to be a peace forum of universal character, the GDR once again is hosting representatives from numerous countries of all continents and from international organizations,” says Erich Honecker’s message of greetings, which was read out by the First Deputy Foreign Minister Dr Herbert Krolkowski, at the beginning of the discussions. The recent change for the better in international relations, the greetings message goes on to say, is epitomized by the ratification and implementation of the INF Treaty. This increases the relevance of the ideas about creating nuclear-free zones and other zones with reduced arms as a means to liberate the world from the diabolical weapons of mass destruction for all time. The meeting in Berlin encouraged the GDR persistently and resourcefully to continue its policy, followed consistently since its founding 40 years ago, which calls not for force but for peaceful coexistence and cooperation to be the supreme norm of the life of the peoples.

The change from confrontation to detente increasingly influences the international climate and bilateral, regional, and multilateral relations between states, said SED Politburo member Hermann Axen in his opening address. The chairman of the People’s Chamber Foreign Affairs Committee paid tribute to the Soviet-U.S. treaty

on the removal of medium- and short-range missiles. The GDR, which made its contribution and still is contributing to the creation of the INF Treaty, will continue to work constructively on its implementation. Thus disarmament is possible, he said, and complicated security policy problems are soluble too, if the political will is present and if there is a fair balance of the interests of the parties involved under the principles of equality and equal security.

"The GDR welcomes the resumption of Soviet-U.S. negotiations on strategic offensive weapons with adherence to the ABM Treaty," Hermann Axen said. In spite of all these positive tendencies, one cannot overlook the fact that the world situation continues to be complicated and contradictory. There still are forces that cling to the dangerous cliches of military strength and the striving for military superiority. This endangers the continuation of the disarmament process, the speaker said.

The supreme maxim of GDR foreign policy is, and remains, to work purposefully and resourcefully for peace and security. The GDR unreservedly favors the security principles codified in the Helsinki Final Acts. Since the international meeting in June 1988, the GDR has made new disarmament initiatives and disarmament measures of its own, Herman Axen said. The socialist states are putting forward wide-ranging proposals at the Vienna negotiations in order to change the strength and structure of the forces of the Warsaw Pact and NATO in such a way that the capacity for surprise attacks and large-scale offensives is removed. The GDR is aware that the struggle for a world free of nuclear weapons, of war and force, requires many stages and steps. Hence it still favors partial disarmament measures.

Participation in the present meeting indicates that there is great interest in the continuation of the dialogue on all issues connected with regional nuclear-free zones. The speaker concluded by proposing meetings at intervals of 1-2 years or—if international developments demand—even more often, in order to exchange views, discuss proposals, and undertake a review of achievements.

Honecker Message to Participants
*AU2906204989 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 28 Jun 89 p 1*

[ND report: "Open Dialogue for Securing Peace; Greetings Message From Erich Honecker to the Participants in the Meeting of the International Liaison Office for Nuclear-Free Zones"]

[Text] Berlin (ND)—Erich Honecker, chairman of the GDR State Council and general secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany [SED], has conveyed the following greetings message to the participants in the meeting of the International Liaison Office for Nuclear-Free Zones, which started in Berlin on Tuesday [27 June]:

Dear ladies and gentlemen, dear friends,

One year after the International Meeting for Nuclear-Free Zones in Berlin, which developed into a universal peace forum, the GDR is again the host of representatives from numerous countries of all continents and international organizations that want to discuss measures to secure peace by continuing disarmament, above all to free mankind from nuclear weapons, in an open dialogue.

Permit me to thank you for your participation and to convey to you sincere wishes for the successful course of the meeting.

The turn for the better initiated in international relations is characterized by the ratification and implementation of the INF Treaty. This increases the topicality of the ideas about establishing nuclear-free and other zones with reduced armament as a way of freeing the earth from the hellish mass destruction weapons for all times.

The honor which you pay us by your participation in this meeting encourages the GDR, perseveringly and rich in initiatives, to continue the policy of establishing a world in which not violence but peaceful coexistence and cooperation are the supreme guideline of the peoples' lives, which it has consistently pursued since its establishment 40 years ago.

I greet the meeting and welcome you in this spirit!

E. Honecker.

Foreign Ministry's Krolkowski Explains Peace Policy to Visiting Swedes

*AU2406161189 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 22 Jun 89 p 2*

[ADN report: "Swedish Parliamentarians Received for Talks"]

[Text] East Berlin—Herbert Krolkowski, state secretary and first deputy foreign minister, received a delegation of the Defense Council of the Swedish Parliament, which is currently on an official visit to the GDR, on Wednesday [21 June].

During an exchange of views on topical international issues, Herbert Krolkowski explained the GDR's peace policy and elaborated in detail on its position on the strengthening of security and cooperation in Europe. The two sides were in agreement concerning the two states' stance on the reduction of nuclear and conventional military confrontation, and the promising start of the Vienna talks on conventional armed forces and confidence-building measures in Europe.

Herbert Krolkowski pointed out that, in order to ensure the deepening of the process of detente, all forces of peace must resolutely call for the continuation of the

disarmament process without delay. The GDR is particularly in favor of creating distance between the offensive potentials at the border between the two alliances in Europe. It is important to achieve a state of mutual incapability to attack. However, this is only possible if dangerous weapons such as tactical nuclear weapons are not excluded from the disarmament process and not modernized, Krokowski stated.

Security Issues Discussed at Bonn Colloquium
AU2406165389 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 22 Jun 89 p 5

[ADN report: "Colloquium on European Security Issues in Bonn"]

[Text] Bonn—Security and disarmament in Europe were at the center of the Fifth Scientific Colloquium between the Friedrich Ebert Foundation and the Academy for Social Sciences of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and the GDR Politics and Economics Institute, which ended in Bonn on Wednesday [21 June], after 3 days of discussions. Both sides agreed that there has been progress in international relations on the path toward lasting peace, and that there is no alternative to the policy of dialogue. The disarmament process must be continued until a structural incapability to attack is achieved. In this context, the two German states have a special responsibility.

Both sides spoke in favor of new security structures that must replace the principle of deterrence. The GDR side pointed out that further progress can only be achieved if the principles of Helsinki, including the recognition of territorial integrity and sovereignty, as well as the principle of noninterference, are respected.

The colloquium was attended by, among others, Wilhelm Bruns, head of the Research Department of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation; retired Brigade General Christian Krause; Karsten Voigt, member of the Executive of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, and on the GDR side by the institute directors of the Academy for Social Sciences, Prof Rolf Reissig and Prof Werner Paff, as well as Colonel Helmut Geidel of the National People's Army.

POLAND

Daily Views Pact's Military Defense Doctrine
AU2906074289 Warsaw ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI in Polish
26 Jun 89 p 4

[Unattributed APN article 'specially for ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI': "The Defense Doctrine of the Warsaw Pact States"]

[Text] Political means of settling international conflicts and disputes are the only permissible way of guaranteeing universal and national security in the space and nuclear age. That is the idea behind the Warsaw Pact's modern military doctrine.

The document entitled "Concerning the Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Pact Member-States," adopted by the Political Consultative Committee in May 1987, clearly indicates the defensive nature of socialism's military strategy. Successive provisions of this doctrine are being expounded on the basis of a realistic assessment of world processes at a time of restructuring of the domestic and foreign policies of the countries belonging to the defense alliance. Generally speaking, the doctrine consists of the following fundamental political and military-technical aspects:

General Principles

- In the current situation, there is no alternative to peaceful coexistence, competition, and cooperation between countries belonging to different systems;
- A respect for the freedom of social development of nations is one of the most important prerequisites for international security and stability;
- The countries of the socialist community do not consider any country or people as an enemy, and have no territorial claims against any country in and outside Europe;
- There can be no victors in a nuclear war;
- Security can only be reciprocal, based on a balance of interests and balance of military forces (military-strategic parity) at the lowest possible level.

Military Commitments and the Principles of Building a Military Complex

- A strictly defensive and purely vengeful nature of military action;
- The commitment not to be the first to use a nuclear weapon;
- Preserving military potentials at a level of sensible sufficiency necessary to ensure defense;
- Adapting the structure, equipment, and deployment of armed forces to defense tasks;
- Preserving the capability to firmly repel an eventual aggression.

The New Shape of Military Doctrine

In accordance with today's interpretation, the Warsaw Pact's military doctrine is a "system of officially approved fundamental views on how to prevent war, build a military complex, prepare Warsaw Pact countries and their armed forces to repel aggression, and conduct military activity in defense of socialism." It is usual for Warsaw Pact military doctrine to contain two sides, a political side, and a military-technical side. As far as the political side is concerned, its substance boils down to a commitment by the socialist countries to the cause of peace, with a readiness to defend it in the event of a surprise attack.

The military-technical side of the doctrine is subordinated to the political side, and establishes: a) the nature of the military threat, the type of military action that is required, and the tasks stemming from this action; b) the

armed forces that are needed to perform these tasks; c) the level of preparedness for the armed forces to solve the basic tasks facing them, and the necessary curricula for soldiers' training. This side of the defense doctrine defines the main criteria necessary to maintain the combat readiness of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact.

What Have the Warsaw Pact States Abandoned, and What Have They Added to Their Military Doctrine

The military doctrine of the USSR and its allies also possessed a defensive nature earlier. Whereas it was the political side to the doctrine that established its defensive nature (the socialist countries were the first to undertake not to start a war against anyone), the military-technical side possessed a militant nature (an attack was considered the main way to repel an aggression). This discrepancy has now been removed.

The task of "preventing war" has been added to the basic provisions of the doctrine for the first time. This task forms the supreme goal and nucleus of the doctrine and is of great political significance.

First, the Warsaw Pact countries hold that not only a general nuclear war, but also a widespread conventional war in Europe would have catastrophic effects on the whole of mankind. Having rejected the "theoretical" justification of the possibilities of their own victory in a third world war, the socialist countries have convinced political and military activists and world opinion that there can be no victors at all in such a war.

Second, the new military doctrine also reflects the following truth: The likelihood of a new war depends not only on foreign policy and diplomacy, but also on the strategy employed in establishing a military potential. Up to a certain limit, a quantitative increase in defense capability really does serve to prevent a war. However, as soon as this limit is exceeded, defense systems become a threat, however peaceful the foreign policy of the relevant country might be. In other words, Warsaw Pact doctrine in its present shape requires that the composition of armed forces and the numbers and types of armaments in their possession be strictly adapted to the level of military threat and to the actual relationship between the military potentials of each side.

The reality is such that security and the building of a military potential in Warsaw Pact countries cannot be considered in isolation from security and the building of a military potential in NATO countries, and vice versa. However, such an interdependence should have a positive effect. The Warsaw Pact considers such a positive effect to be the new elastic and compromise-like policy of the opposing blocs; the efforts to overcome the anachronisms of confrontation and the reasons for the suspicion and mistrust between the blocs; and the activity aimed at creating a new structure of international relations in which there would be less and less room for elements of force.

Major changes have also occurred in the military-technical side to the doctrine. At present, its defensive nature is finding practical expression in concrete strategic solutions aimed at reorganizing national armed forces and preparing them in an operational and combat sense.

From the point of view of the art of war, defense operations are becoming the central feature of the strategy of the Warsaw Pact armed forces. This strategy completely rules out the possibility of any preemptive strike, regardless of the political circumstances in favor of such a strike. New views about the nature and effects of modern warfare have led to the abandonment of planned wide-scale strategic operations by offensive land forces in order to achieve "victorious results." Counter-offensive action is viewed in more realistic terms. Its purpose is to halt the aggressor, reestablish the status quo ante, and prevent an escalation of military action and a loss of control by both sides over this action. This is the underlying thought behind the preparations of armies and fleets, and this is the principle behind all fundamental documents, including combat regulations.

Concerning the structure and deployment of armed forces, a strong reorganization of forces is taking place, with particular emphasis on a reduction of offensive forces, especially along the lines of possible confrontation, and of the entire offensive potential. Major importance is attached to an expansion of different branches of armed forces that is as closely balanced as possible, and to a qualitative improvement to these armed forces that corresponds totally to the principle of reasonable defense sufficiency and does not present a provocation vis-a-vis the other side. In this connection, many military-technical programs are being revised, and work on and the production of arms and military systems, especially strike systems, is being curtailed.

How Does Warsaw Pact Military Doctrine Differ From NATO Military Concepts?

The main difference between the military concepts of the two sides is that the Warsaw Pact does not recognize the "wisdom" of politics from a position of strength, which the NATO command continues to extol officially. Although both sides declare their devotion to peace and underline the defensive nature of their military preparations, an entire series of provisions of NATO doctrine are conspicuous for the inflexible stance expressed therein, which the Warsaw Pact interprets as a challenge and political-psychological pressure.

When the USSR, with the full support of its allies, puts forth a program to rid the world of nuclear weapons, the United States, Great Britain, and France believe that nuclear "restrictions" and a "flexible reaction" concept should continue to be the alpha and omega of NATO defense strategy. The North Atlantic Pact's shunning of a commitment not to be the first to use a nuclear weapon is a continuation of this stance.

Actually, the NATO military-political leadership does not deny the possibility of an "overpowering" pre-emptive strike if the "situation calls for it." The very way of thinking represented by the idea of a first strike carries a highly negative and dangerous psychological payload. It increases the likelihood of an error in assessing the situation, and may play a fatal role by initiating an armed conflict which might have been avoided.

Although officially the NATO command recognizes the possibility of a victory in a nuclear war, the entire construction of a military potential in the United States and other major countries of the North Atlantic pact is taking place according to the principle: "If it is impossible to stop a war, then it should be fought and completed according to conditions that are favorable for the West." This is also the reasoning behind the present plans for military operations involving a deployment of armed forces along the opponent's entire line of defense. This is also the source of the inflexibility and aggressiveness of some of the NATO command's military-strategic principles, which involve the need to achieve military-technical superiority over the Warsaw Pact. Such assumptions pose the threat of a new arms spiral, and cancel out the idea of reducing the level of military confrontation.

Warsaw Pact Military Doctrine and Disarmament Issues

The Warsaw Pact's new doctrinal views are directly geared to a search for a constructive compromise with NATO in order to tidy up arms controls. Combining unilateral steps with bilateral and multilateral agreements on reducing strategic offensive weapons and other nuclear and conventional armed forces and armaments is the road which the Soviet Union and its allies intend to tread constantly. This road completely conforms to the defensive essence of Warsaw Pact military doctrine. The members of this alliance have committed themselves to pursuing paths of action leading to the following objectives, among others:

- The soonest possible complete and universal ban on nuclear tests, as the first step in the work of stopping the design, production, and improvement of nuclear weapons; gradually reducing and completely eliminating these weapons; and preventing the arms race from spreading to space;
- A ban on and elimination of chemical and other types of mass-destruction weapons;
- A reduction of conventional armed forces and armaments to a level at which neither side, having guaranteed defense resources, possesses enough resources to carry out a surprise attack on the other side or expand offensive operations around the world;
- Close control over all resources and disarmament steps;
- A simultaneous abolition of the North Atlantic pact and Warsaw Pact and the creation of a system of universal international security.

Military Doctrine and Military Confidence Measures

Thanks to the great openness and clarity of the way in which the Warsaw Pact countries have built their military potential, and thanks to their readiness to make their own contribution to the creation of a fail-safe mechanism to block armed conflicts and consolidate international security, the Warsaw Pact countries are earning increasing recognition from world opinion. The Warsaw Pact holds the view that all countries should abandon methods of confrontation and seek effective forms and methods of cooperation in the military sphere. Combining the efforts of Warsaw Pact and NATO military bodies in the struggle to prevent war is not an easy task.

The first stage of this task could involve abandoning prejudices, restructuring the doctrines of both alliances, and examining the paths of their further development, taking into account the realities and global problems mankind is facing. The achievement of this objective might be encouraged by the formation of a European center dealing with a reduction in military danger and a prevention of unexpected aggression, and by an expansion of confidence measures to include navies and strategic and tactical air forces.

To remove the mutual suspicion that has been accumulating for years and achieve a better understanding of the other side's intentions, one must have the desire to take matters the way they are and throw away the rotting banners of the cold war era. The USSR and its allies are ready for a more open and intensive exchange of military concepts and opinions, and of experiences in building a defense potential.

Observers To Attend Orion-89 Exercise Under CDE Accords

*LD2706185789 Warsaw Television Service in Polish
1730 GMT 27 Jun 89*

[Text] [Announcer] A military training exercise code-named "Orion-89" will be taking place in the vicinity of Zielona Gora and Zagan from today until 30 June. Colonel Ireneusz Czyzewski, press spokesman of the Ministry of National Defense, is our guest in the television news studio:

[Czyzewski] Over 17,000 soldiers, mainly from the 11th Dresden Armored Division but also support units and selected air force units, will take part in the "Orion." The course of the exercise is defined by the defensive nature of our military doctrine. For this reason the units which will take part in the exercise will be involved mainly in preparing and conducting defensive operations.

[Unidentified correspondent] Will foreign military observers be present?

[Czyzewski] Yes. According to the decisions adopted by the Stockholm Conference, all military exercises with the

participation of over 17,000 soldiers must be notified. Thus, "Orion" is being watched by 41 representatives from 22 states by invitation from our government. Such a large number of observers from states belonging to the Warsaw Pact, NATO, and also some neutral states, shows that great significance is being attached at present to the observing of exercises as one of the confidence-building measures in the military sphere.

Large-scale exercises are conducted only rarely in our country. As a state we have always been in favor of limiting the frequency at which they are conducted, as well as the number of soldiers participating in them.

I would like to point out that foreign observers were guests in Poland in 1987 for the first time and now this is the second time.

[Correspondent] Thank you very much.

ROMANIA

SCINTEIA Commentary on Vienna CFE/CSBM Negotiations

AU2706161489 Bucharest AGERPRES in English
1459 GMT 27 Jun 89

[“For a Europe of Peace, Security and Collaboration by Building Up Confidence Among States”—AGERPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest, AGERPRES, 27/06/1989—A commentary in the Romanian daily SCINTEIA of 27 June regarding the double negotiations in Vienna on the conventional armed forces in Europe and on new confidence- and security-building measures in Europe shows inter alia:

Considering the development of cooperation and the achievement of security on the European continent as fundamental targets of its foreign policy, Romania has permanently militated for the adoption of firm confidence-building and disarmament measures, of nuclear disarmament first and foremost, without which the achievement of a real security and peace on the continent is inconceivable. “We consider—President Nicolae Ceausescu showed—that everything should be done so that new disarmament and confidence-building measures be taken in Europe, for the achievement of a united Europe of all nations regardless of social system, starting from the observance of each European people's right to choose the system it wishes”.

During the preparatory stage of the conference in Helsinki Romania formulated the idea of calling up a European disarmament conference, stressing the necessity that, on the basis of consultations, all the participating states should examine the whole question regarding the military disengagement and disarmament in Europe. Upon Romania's initiative and owing to its perseverent efforts the Final Act in Helsinki included a separate

chapter on disarmament and confidence-building on the continent. In the same spirit, Romania has consistently worked for the achievement, within the all-European meeting in Madrid, of the consensus for calling up the conference on confidence- and security-building and disarmament measures in Europe whose first stage was held in Stockholm over 1984-1986.

The document of the Stockholm Conference, which marked an important progress in comparison with the provisions of the Final Act in Helsinki, provided for a series of concrete, practical and rigorously defined measures obligatory and applicable on the entire European territory.

Romania appreciated that the document of the Stockholm Conference represented a good starting point for achieving the goals of the new negotiations in spite of the fact that the measures covenanted had contributed neither to diminish the intensity and expansion of the military activities on the continent nor to reduce the possibility of launching an armed attack. In Romania's opinion, the negotiations in Vienna should mark a new stage by passing from merely stating the goal of achieving a greater confidence and predictability to really reducing the conditions which could permit the launching of an attack by surprise or other large-scale offensive actions.

For achieving those targets, Romania presented certain specific proposals which—beside the proposals other states advanced—are to be discussed during the negotiations in Vienna.

In Romania's opinion the new set of confidence- and security-building measures should include among other things: the reduction of intensity and area of military activities; the renunciation of certain activities which could generate mistrust and tension; the limitation of possibilities of large-scale offensive actions; the setting of measures apt to prevent nuclear accidents, etc.

A first group of Romania's proposals deals with the creation of security zones and corridors along interstate borders and at the line between the two military alliances.

Romania proposed renunciation of multinational military maneuvers along interstate borders, the creation of areas along them where no maneuvers should take place nor the movement and concentration of armed forces and armaments, where no important element of such forces should be put on the alert, the withdrawal of offensive armaments, the reduction of armed forces and armaments and the limitation of military activities in those areas for their turning into demilitarized zones. Resuming a proposal advanced at the Stockholm Conference, Romania has again suggested the creation, along the borders between the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries, of an as large as possible corridor free of nuclear, chemical and other weapons of mass destruction

and, in perspective, free of any armaments and military activities except for border guards.

A negative influence is exerted on the international life by the military confrontation on the continent owing especially to the existence of foreign military bases and troops in the territory of other states. That is why Romania advanced in Vienna the proposal that no new troops should be dislocated and no new military bases should be emplaced in the territory of other states, that an end should be put to the development and modernization of the ones in place. Romania also suggested the freezing of military expenditure at the current level and the beginning of negotiations with a view to cut them afterwards.

To avoid the possible accidents with nuclear weapons which can start a nuclear conflagration, Romania proposed that maneuvers and movements of ships and aircraft which transport nuclear weapons nearby terrestrial and maritime frontiers of other states be banned and no military activities be organized next to peaceful nuclear plants. Of special significance in this framework is to stimulate the creation of zones of peace, cooperation and

good neighbourliness, free of nuclear and chemical weapons in the Balkans, in central and northern Europe.

In the current conditions of a growing war danger through accidents, Romania suggested the creation of a direct communication system for consultations between heads of state and government and the organization of summit meetings in emergency cases. Romania also pointed to the importance of developing contacts and consultations on European security, with greater attention to be paid to broadening the dialogue between the states of the two military alliances with a view to providing the necessary conditions for a gradual passage to the simultaneous dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO.

Romania is determined to fully contribute to the success of Vienna negotiations, to the adoption of new confidence- and security-building measures apt to help stimulate the disarmament process, advance on the path opened by the Helsinki Conference and build a united Europe of peace, collaboration and understanding among all peoples.

INDIA

Foreign Minister Criticizes U.S.-Soviet Talks Since INF Treaty
52500040 Bombay *THE TIMES OF INDIA* in English
20 May 89 p 11

[Excerpts] Harare, May 19 (PTI)—India has urged the Non-Aligned Movement [NAM] to re-orient its thrust and streamline its functioning to face "today's realities and tomorrow's challenges" and ensure that it is associated with the process or resolution of major global and regional issues.

"We are convinced that democracy in international relations is a better way of promoting lasting solutions than imposition of decisions on unwilling parties," the external affairs minister, Mr. P. V. Narasimha Rao, said.

Speaking at the ministerial meeting of the co-ordinating bureau of NAM here yesterday, he said NAM had consistently rejected the tendency of the strong and the powerful to prescribe what was good for others. The essence of NAM was retention of the freedom to take decisions independently, in accordance with the perception of each country as to its national interest. [passage omitted]

Reminding the NAM members that the major thrust of the movement in the coming years would have to be on consolidation of the process of nuclear disarmament so as to make it permanent and irreversible, the external affairs minister said following the signing of the INF treaty by the United States and the Soviet Union in 1987, the "pace of advance has slowed down."

The commitment of these two major countries to reduce their strategic nuclear weapons to half the present levels had not made headway, he added. Besides, new weapon systems continued to be developed. There was a feeling that the gains of the INF treaty were being frittered away, he said.

Mr Rao noted that the fundamental difficulty which was causing delays was that there was no broader objective other than discredited doctrine of deterrence, underpinning this exercise. Suspicions were still strong as thinking continued to be dominated by the attitudes of the cold war era.

PAKISTAN

Defense Minister: India's Agni Missile Threat to Security
BK2906155489 Islamabad Domestic Service in Urdu
1500 GMT 29 Jun 89

[Excerpt] The minister of state for defense, Retired Colonel Ghulam Sarwar Cheema, told the National Assembly during question hour today that India's recent experimental flight of the medium-range missile Agni constitutes a threat to the security of Pakistan. He said that the Agni missile is capable of carrying either conventional or nuclear weapons. Saying that the government is fully aware of this issue, the minister made it clear that the most efficient form of defense against the threat of such a missile are radar systems to detect the missile and an antimissile system. These two systems are very expensive and their acquisition is almost impossible. Under these circumstances, the best course is the acquisition of missiles with a similar offensive capabilities and in this connection Pakistan has already successfully test fired Hatf-1 and Hatf-2. [passage omitted]

Article Assesses Admiral Crowe's Moscow Visit
AU2206142689 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak
21 Jun 89 p 5

[Article "written for Bratislava PRAVDA" by APN commentator Vladimir Ostrovskiy in the "A Word on Events" column: "What Admiral W. Crowe Learned in Moscow"]

[Text] Crowe learned that the monetary value of the Soviet Army and Navy is R20.2 billion (American taxpayers pay \$163.1 billion for similar components of the U.S. Armed Forces), that the Soviet Su-27 fighter plane costs R5.8 billion (a similar American F-15 aircraft costs \$28 million). He also inspected the new Tu-160 strategic bomber.

Admiral W. Crowe learned directly from the Soviet Armed Forces' General Staff that the Soviet military budget totaling R77.3 billion will be reduced by R10 billion annually. In this way, military expenditures will be considerably reduced by 1991. However, the Soviet disarmament policy results in other tasks. For example, in 1995 the overall share of the expenditure for the Army, earmarked for this purpose in the national income, is to decrease 1.5- to 2-times.

In the past, obtaining the aforementioned facts from the strictly classified Soviet budget, would cost American intelligence, including military intelligence, millions of dollars. Here, namely, one has to include, among other things, the space-based means of verification—the Sputnik espionage.

However, today the times are different. Soviet restructuring has resulted in the military budget being published, and the delegates to the first session of the Congress of the USSR People's Deputies being briefed on it. The deliberations were attended by the chief of the Soviet general staff, Army General M. Moiseyev, as deputy, who played host to his American colleague. There was nothing else left to do for the representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the U.S. Armed Forces, but to accurately jot down the figures and words he heard during the deliberations. He found out, among other things, about changes in the doctrine determining the buildup of Soviet Armed Forces, and acquainted himself with their new structure and defensive character. The American Admiral then acquainted himself with our views on the inadmissibility of the threat of or the use of force. They explained to him our position in detail: Only dialogue and talks which respect both sides' interests are capable of resolving international problems and lead to the peaceful settlement of conflicts. On the basis of concrete data from the Soviet military budget, the American Admiral could glean that the Soviet Union is not pressing only for the elimination of nuclear weapons; that the objective of the reduction of the Soviet defensive potential is to achieve the level of reasonable sufficiency. We are ready to discuss these problems, and expand cooperation with all states that agree with this.

During the chat between Army General M. Moiseyev, chief of the Soviet Army's General Staff, and Admiral

W. Crowe, I witnessed a new aspect in USSR-U.S. political dialogue—its extension to the military sphere. In the past this would have been difficult to imagine. The dialogue on the highest level between our big powers, which is characteristic of recent years, has given impetus to the development and intensification of contacts in the military sphere. It has become the foundation for arriving at an agreement on averting direct military threat. Thus, the new comprehensive Soviet-American treaty, which excludes the possibility of coincidental military conflict between us, goes into effect on 1 January 1990.

The opinion of the Soviet military command is that knowing one another always helps to deepen trust between partners. Abandoning the image of the enemy, and looking at one another as partners—in this we see the purpose of the Moscow meeting between the American and Soviet military representatives. Therefore, it is not surprising that Admiral W. Crowe described his stay in Moscow as very interesting.

Premier Ryzhkov Opens Naval Arms Control Forum

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
27 Jun 89 First Edition p 1

[Statement by N. Ryzhkov: "To the Participants of the XVII International 'Peace on the Seas' Conference"]

[Text] I welcome the participants of the XVII International "Peace on the Seas" Conference.

All countries are deeply interested in the use of the seas and oceans as transportation routes, as sources of food and industrial raw materials, as sources of energy, and as objects for researching and getting to know nature. The path to this lies through the curtailing of the naval arms race, through limiting naval activities on the seas, through the creation of nuclear weapons free zones.

The Soviet Union is in favor of naval forces, which are an important component of the military power of governments and alliances, becoming the object of an active international dialogue on the reduction of arms and disarmament. It is necessary at the same time to guarantee the security of sea communications, to exclude the use of force on the seas, and to fully eliminate all concerns which governments may have on this account.

A wide discussion of these and other essential problems at your conference, and the active presentations of various social circles in support of law and order and the defense of the environment in the world's oceans and for the recognition of the primacy of international law, will allow a genuine and stable security for all governments and peoples.

Your conference, is yet another testimony to the growing role of nongovernment organizations and people's diplomacy in the international arena.

I wish you success in your work for the good of the world and for progress.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Broad Elite Sentiment Against SNF Modernization

Senior Bundeswehr Staff Officer
36200183z Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German
29 May 89 pp 23-25

[Article by Rear Admiral Elmar Schmaehling, head of the Federal Armed Forces' Office of Studies and Exercises: "Suicide in Case of Attack"]

[Text] What has gotten into the Germans? Whatever are the Americans thinking?

For the first time in the history of U.S.-German postwar relations, a fight has flared up between Washington and Bonn, one so violent that some politicians and some in the military are already predicting the end of the Western Alliance.

No, it is not a matter of whether the Alliance should acquire new short-range nuclear missiles and when negotiations should be held with the Soviets about these weapons. What is being debated is the role of nuclear weapons in Western defense and, consequently, the strategy of flexible response, which has been in effect for more than 20 years. The apparent conflict regarding new short-range missiles reveals the deep chasm in the alliance between unequal partners; this chasm has always existed, to be sure, but it was rarely, almost never, talked about: On the one hand are the nuclear powers, on the other the have-nots.

To exaggerate a bit: In the conflict with the evil Communists, the Americans have the lethal weapons, the Germans the soldiers and the battlefield. This is how it has been possible to keep going until now, trusting in God and in common sense.

And then suddenly a man named Mikhail Gorbachev came along, who with his disarmament proposals took away from NATO precisely what had held it together until then: the feeling of being threatened.

The numbers of Soviet tanks and guns, aircraft and ships had always been contested, even among experts. But the fact that a threat from the East existed—who could doubt that?

And now? The man in the Kremlin wants to disarm down to NATO strength, as his proposals show. Balance—hasn't that been a Western demand for years? And the nuclear weapons? Weren't they there in order to offset the conventional superiority of the East; weren't they to deter Moscow from using its tanks and guns?

How can the citizen comprehend that in this situation NATO does not grasp the chance for disarmament but stalls and hesitates and demands new weapons, which it

would then—the East and West have at least gotten this far—happily demonstrate to Soviet observers at the next exercise?

The inspector general of the Federal Armed Forces in the cockpit of a MiG-29, the Soviet chief of the General Staff subsequently in the cockpit of a Tornado, officers of the GDR People's Army soon to be at the Command School in Hamburg, Federal Armed Forces officers at the military academy in Dresden: How does all of this fit in with new weapons and old war games, in which nuclear weapons are used as artillery was previously—without regard to losses, as it said in the prewar German Wehrmacht report?

And the Americans? They can receive satellite pictures of the nuclear holocaust in Europe, just as they once got war reports from the jungles of Vietnam. Europe is far, far away.

Gorbachev has not only kicked off "new thinking" in his own country; he has opened the eyes of many in our country as well to an absurd situation. What today bursts to the surface in such an explosive manner is the doubt, for years so valiantly suppressed, regarding the sense—or lack of it—of NATO strategy.

As long as the threat from the East could be credibly sold to the people, questions of strategy, questions of vital German interest, were always subordinated to loyalty to the Alliance and a demonstration of unity. If a conflict cannot be avoided, then it is better to be on the side of the Americans who have everything: ammunition, fuel, food.

Even today many Germans still do not understand that the FRG's membership in NATO served two decisive purposes from the viewpoint of the victorious Western powers: first, West Germany was to be kept under strict control; this—and this alone—was of interest to the Western neighbors. No national army, no German General Staff, no thoughts of neutrality.

Later, it made perfect sense to the victor to use the growing economic power of the FRG for military defense of the entire West. The Germans should not keep out of the East-West conflict and quietly go about their business. German rearment was the entry ticket into the club of Western democracies; German interests were always just a subset of the interests of the victorious Western powers.

If the principal reason for the necessity of German armed forces, the Warsaw Pact threat, is dwindling today, a crisis of legitimacy will be the logical result for the West German armed forces. This applies to the strategy of nuclear deterrence as well.

The attempt by once again replaced Defense Minister Rupert Scholz to declare German armed forces an

expression of a sovereign people's desire for self-assertion was doomed to fail from the beginning. Such a self-image is reserved for the superpowers, but so far there has been no understanding at all for the Germans who have been beaten twice within a generation.

It remains to be seen whether the West Germans will really, as some foreign observers maintain, step out from under the shadow of the postwar era. It is also uncertain whether this normalization will be understood by our allies. It is simply a fact. And Americans, British, and Frenchmen will have to accept it.

However, it is important to a partnership that both sides know each other well, that different interests can be freely discussed, and that these differences are ultimately respected. This has always been lacking in the relationship between America and the FRG.

Until now, we have proceeded with the argument that there were hardly any varying interests. Americans and Europeans were said to be citizens of democracies which were bound by the same values; in Europe the U. S. was also defending its own interests and values, and what was good for the one must also be good for the other.

All of that was never quite true, but now the weaknesses of this line of argumentation are becoming evident. There are more than just historical and geopolitical differences between the FRG and the U.S. In the course of three generations, Germans still living today, or their parents and grandparents, experienced more unhappiness and misery than people are actually capable of enduring. This has left scars.

The citizens of the United States have hardly experienced the same in their history. American soldiers have always set out to fight in other parts of the world for higher ideals: "The U. S. will always fight for liberty." True, they have suffered losses, bitter defeats, and difficult psychological setbacks. The trauma of the lost Vietnam war explains many traits of U. S. militarism. Even today a majority of Americans are prepared to wage war anywhere in the world.

We Germans, on the other hand, would once again have the next war at home. Germany-East and Germany-West would be the battlefield. Isn't it this experience which leads to different assessments and which to many Americans suddenly appears as cowardice in front of the Communists? Doesn't our caution perhaps resemble the behavior of a burned child?

There is a great deal of difference, after all, between soldiers becoming the victims of war and entire families, entire regions, entire communities being wiped out.

These different lessons learned by the two peoples have always played a role in the last 40 years, but only now—in the fight for missiles and war scenarios—have they become really clear.

To the Germans, war, even one played down as conventional, can no longer be the means for solving a conflict. To the Americans, a war with the prospect of victory can still be fought. War is and remains an optional action for the superpowers; even nuclear war is conceivable to Americans and Russians—as long as it can be kept far from one's own territory. Although it has always been disputed, there is and has been a nuclear complicity between the superpowers.

The fundamentally different thinking of the politicians, the military, and the arms manufacturers on the other side of the Atlantic colors their actions as well. Everything that is thought and done in America—and perhaps with a decreasing tendency in the Soviet Union—is always aimed at the possibility of successful warfare. This is also one reason why Washington does not want to accept the situation that the nuclear-strategic arms arsenal of the United States could be neutralized by the double-strike capability of the Soviet Union.

Even the American experience that the United States had a monopoly in nuclear weapons for only a short time and was then confronted with an equally matched Soviet military power, has not changed this attitude. On the contrary, the greater the certainty that the United States was no longer able to win over the Soviet Union militarily, the more desperately the Reagan administration searched for a way out. In such negotiations Europe, without false sentimentality, was assigned the role it had always had for the United States: NATO was and is a component of the strategy against the Soviet Union.

The first solo American action was Reagan's statement that the threat of nuclear extermination had become implausible in view of the stalemate between the major powers. That is why a Strategic Defense (SDI) had to be built to protect America from nuclear annihilation. The terrified Germans asked whether there might be variable security in the Western Alliance zones. A strategic defense—if it were ever to work—protects the United States against Soviet missiles, but who protects the Europeans?

The second shock to the Federal Government was Reagan's agreement with Moscow regarding the scrapping of intermediate-range nuclear weapons. Yesterday's arguments—that with the Pershings and cruise missiles America is coupled to the fate of Europe—were suddenly no longer valid. German politicians publicly linked to this treaty their expectation that it would be the beginning of a whole series of disarmament agreements. The slogan: The shorter the range, the deader the Germans.

It was a misunderstanding. The Germans thought the United States would next negotiate a reduction or even an elimination of short-range missiles as well. The Americans see it somewhat differently; to them, only those weapons must go which, if used, could draw U. S. territory into a nuclear war. Short-range weapons cannot do that. They spare the Soviet Union and therefore—

according to the American logic—don't immediately challenge Moscow to nuclear retaliation against the United States.

The study of an American long-term strategy, published in January 1988, fit seamlessly into this logic. Security experts such as Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski left no doubt that an automatic nuclear coupling of the United States to Europe in the long run is unacceptable to the Americans. They demanded the introduction of new nuclear weapons which—in the sense of a "differentiated deterrent"—allow for regional nuclear weapons deployment without entering into the risk of an escalation.

Isn't it logical, then, that the U. S. administration today is pushing for the modernization of these tactical nuclear weapons? From the American point of view this is a convincing concept. To NATO, above all for the credibility of the joint strategy, this thinking is not only troublesome, it is unimaginable. Who wants to fry for the sake of a loftier purpose?

Behind the desire of the Americans to keep the nuclear battlefield capability modern stands the conviction that wars can be fought and won even in the nuclear age, if they can be regionally limited—meaning to Europe. To the Americans, the only wars that can no longer be fought or won are major nuclear wars, nuclear-strategic wars which could also destroy the United States. That is how simple it is, basically. And in the long run no one benefits, neither the Americans nor we, from closing our eyes to these facts.

To the Germans, even to most military people, small nuclear weapons have for a long time not been means of warfare, but only weapons of deterrence. Nevertheless, they stick to a strategy which reflects only American interests. This concept ends when the question is posed as to what will happen when deterrence fails. Or is the old strategy of flexible response adhered to only because no one can think of anything better?

In the social-liberal coalition the conviction had gradually taken root that peace in Europe can only be maintained jointly, by respecting mutual security requirements. But before the concept could be put into practice there was a coalition change. And with that everything remained as it was—at least for the time being.

The spirit of confrontation and military competition continues to live in the United States. U. S. security should not be enhanced through disarmament but by armament; ultimately, even agreements serve only to improve the U. S. position at the expense of the partner. The stubborn haggling between West and East at the various disarmament negotiations cannot be explained in any other way. As if everything actually depended on one nuclear missile, one tank, one ship, or even less.

In the United States high-ranking committees are currently working on studies with the goal of expanding or

restoring the superiority of the United States in individual areas. Former Navy Secretary John Lehman recently boasted at a conference in London of the favorable position from which the United States could react to Soviet negotiating offers. The Soviet Union is said to be at the end of its capability with an armaments budget of 40 percent of gross national product. The United States, on the other hand, spends only 2 percent of its gross national product on defense. Why, then, accommodate the Soviets at this particular time?

The Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States, Lehman swaggered, are the most eager advocates of disarmament negotiations. As long as there are negotiations they receive more weapons. Do the Soviet marshals perhaps have a similar opinion?

A majority of Europeans—with the exception of the Thatcher administration—want cooperation instead of confrontation. To them, disarmament negotiations are not a continuation of the East-West conflict by other means.

And NATO, what does it want, what can it do?

The determination of the United States to deploy new tactical nuclear weapons in Europe is obvious. One has only to listen to the Departments of State and Defense.

The Germans? Obstinate children! Big Daddy will try patiently for a while to make them come to their senses. After all, he knows best what is right. And if that doesn't help, a word of authority is in order. The Germans will soon understand who has the say in the Alliance. Tactical nuclear weapons, which if used would hit the Germans alone or first, seem to be intended as some sort of late punishment for us.

Washington and London are not even shying away from the most absurd arguments when it is a matter of bringing the Germans back to reason: If the Germans had not started World War II, the Soviets would not today stand at the Elbe. But since they brought the Russians to Central Europe with their war, they must now be the first to stick their heads out if there is a final battle—never mind Gorbachev or NATO.

It is high time for us to grow up. With each day NATO strategy is losing more and more credibility. As SPD parliamentary group chief Fritz Erler said more than 20 years ago, "The threat of committing suicide in the event of an attack is not exactly convincing."

Prominent Critical Weekly Editor
362000183 Hamburg *DIE ZEIT* in German
2 Jun 89 p 1

[Commentary by Theo Sommer: "From the Bulwark Into the Future"]

[Text] The cold war is over. Not every politician has understood this. Many are still making their turns on the dance floor and have not even noticed that the music has

long since stopped. But John le Carre understands it, the writer of thrillers, who has turned the cold war into literature with Smiley and Karla. His newest novel—"The Russia House"—is a bittersweet farewell to the past decades of hostility between East and West. And ex-Secret Service man David Cornwall, alias John le Carre, also correctly evaluates the current difficulties in NATO: "Its problem is how to keep going now that it can no longer constantly pick on the external enemy."

Forty years ago, when NATO was founded, everything was very simple. The East European states were groaning under Stalin's yoke. The Berlin Blockade, which ended only 4 weeks after the founding act, had a profound impact on the West. When the North Koreans attacked South Korea in June 1950 everyone was afraid that Western Europe would be the next victim of Soviet expansion. The division of Germany intensified visibly. Stalin's agitprop people laid down a barrage of fire with all they had to try to make war-weakened Western Europe ripe for attack. The purpose of the alliance between the United States and Western Europe was defined with British bluntness by the first NATO secretary general, Lord Ismay, as: "to keep the Americans in, to keep the Russians out, and to keep the Germans down."

Today, in the era of desimplification, everything is much more difficult. In Eastern Europe a new urge for freedom is stirring; unlike before, the Soviets are allowing it free rein. Berlin has been immobilized by the 4-power agreement. The division of Germany has solidified, but the relationship between the two German states has improved. The Soviet leadership is lowering the flag in the outer bastions of the Third World and is concentrating on revitalizing its own backward country. Moscow ideologists have run out of ammunition. NATO, having lost its enemy and enemy image, must ask itself what is still valid of the old maxim: keeping the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down.

Keeping the Americans in Western Europe—sure. The interspersion of the United States in the web of fate in the Old World was the precondition for our survival in freedom. They alone possess the deterrent threat capability for keeping expansionist adventurers in the Kremlin in nuclear check, and, considering the conventional superiority of the East, the 326,000 soldiers in Western Europe—220,000 of them in the FRG—were an effective pledge of joint security. America's involvement in Europe is still needed today and in the near future, as insurance against a potential failure of that opening in the system in the East which we are experiencing at the moment.

Realistic Possibility of Thought

But that does not mean that 326,000 U. S. soldiers would have to remain in Europe for all eternity. If the danger from the East disappears, the U. S. garrison could also be reduced. It is not of a size independent of threat (no more so than the Bundeswehr is, by the way). This

realization is the basis of President Bush's offer to withdraw 20 percent of the U. S. combat troops from Western Europe in return for a reasonable Soviet countermove. A sensible offer: It points in the direction of the future. Whether in the end 150,000, 50,000 or even no U. S. soldiers at all are stationed in Europe depends entirely on the development of East-West relations. But the number 326,000 is neither holy nor untouchable. Even during the Berlin Blockade only 140,000 GI's were stationed in Europe. Why couldn't it be far fewer in times of detente? If things go well, a further reduction of the U. S. garrison need not be excluded, not even a "fourth zero solution:" giving up the padding of Washington's involvement with overseas troops. In any event, the United States would remain politically involved in Europe through the CSCE process.

This presumes, of course, that the second NATO goal is reached. The Russians must be clearly outside and want to remain outside—which not only means no more threat to Europe, but also no Soviet military presence between the Elbe and the Bug. This idea would have been dismissed as sheer illusion a mere 20 years ago. That has changed since Gorbachev: The departure of the Red Army is today a realistic possibility, and a balance of forces the declared goal of both sides.

We are not yet there. However, Gorbachev and Bush have started down the path. It is a long and rocky path. The negotiation work will not be easy: weapons categories must be defined, methods determined, phase goals plotted. Military experts will put a number of spokes in the politicians' wheels. The hope lies primarily in the fact that economic necessity hardens the political will to disarm.

One thing is clear, at least: The objective of inducing the Russians to remove their buffer zone can only be achieved through mutual disarmament. The arms race was perhaps unavoidable, as long as the military pacts faced each other with suspicion. At the time the West had no choice but to found its security on a strategy of deterrence and defense, which deep down was not credible because it was unacceptable to the citizens. All kinds of stopgap measures and white lies were acceptable, as long as there was no alternative. The strategy of flexible response is part of that, the confidence that in the event of war within 10 days six U. S. divisions could actually be thrown into the European front (they don't exist!), the unbroken faith in the possibility of forward defense. The West clung to this with the fatalistic cunning of the Lisbon peddler, who after the great catastrophe of 1755 hawked pills against earthquakes and deflected skeptical objections with the words: "Do you know anything better?" Now there is something better than armament: disarmament. It is the surest method of keeping the Russians out.

But keeping the Germans down? It is still an unspoken *raison d'être* for NATO. Reunification remains a nightmare not only for East Europeans, whose present renationalization does not diminish their old fear of the

Germans (after all, the division of Germany was the result of World War II, not a result of the cold war). The thought of reunification causes even Western friends of the FRG to get a bellyache.

Unreliable Fellows

It is no help at all when the Bonn government repeatedly refers to mellifluous, pompous communiquees, in which the restoration of German unity is praised as an urgent common concern. Our friends don't trust us. They are afraid of a "D-Mark zone from Iceland to Murmansk;" some of them fearfully hold up the image of a "fourth Pan-German Reich." The insistence by the Americans and the British on modernizing the Lance was nothing more than a political attempt to solidify the division of Germany with a new missile barrier under the pretext of military need.

It is paradoxical. The French have one foot in NATO, the other one outside. The British have one foot in the European Community, the other outside. But we, who with Teutonic faithfulness have sworn loyalty to both organizations, must, since we represent our interests with the same plainness as all others, make do with the accusation that we are hangers-on, unreliable fellows, a floating kidney.

And why is all this? Because time and again we come back to our demand for reunification. But our national pride always puts the sincerity of our Western ties in doubt. This will not change as long as we do not unequivocally give up our demand for reunification in favor of a demand for freedom for the East Germans. Unity of the Germans? We can find it in a context other than a central German state: under the roof of a free united Europe, in which there is room for two free German states. Until we openly embrace it, we will constantly risk the use of NATO to discipline the Germans.

The Alliance was to be a "shield against aggression and against the fear of aggression," President Truman said 40 years ago at the signing ceremony—"a bulwark which will allow us to go about the actual business of governments and societies: the task of offering all our citizens a more fulfilled and happier life." At the anniversary summit meeting in Brussels it became clear that the West does not want to become entrenched in the bulwark of the Alliance, but will move toward the new man in the Kremlin.

The politicians of the 16 member nations in the Alliance cannot close their eyes to Eisenhower's words, which John le Carre has put up as the motto for his new East-West thriller: "I believe people desire peace so much that one day the governments will have no choice but to step aside and let them have peace."

Military Industrial Spokesman
36200183 Bonn *MILITARY TECHNOLOGY in English Apr 89 p 6*

[Commentary by Ezio Bonsignore, editor in chief: "The Shorter the Range..."]

[Text] I suspect that you actually ought to live in West Germany—if possible a few hundred meters from a top-priority nuclear target such as the MoD in Bonn, as is the case for this writer—to properly grasp all the nuances and the meanings of the current querelle about what is euphemistically referred to as a "modernization of the LANCE system" (actually, its replacement by a new system with a much longer range). Seen from London or Paris, not to mention Washington, it might appear to be a matter of unreasonable German resistance to a joint NATO programme, studied in the ultimate interests of all member nations. Seen from Bonn, however, and with the highly uncomfortable knowledge that you have been singled out as the clay pigeon for a nuclear firing range, things tend to be perceived in a different way.

Of course, we have all been potential nuclear targets for the past decades—and we have even learned to live with it. The current German situation is quite different, however. To live under a nearly permanent, albeit remote, nuclear threat is still possible if one knows that the very same threat is hanging over the heads of millions of other individuals, in towns as far apart as Boston, Leningrad and Beijing. Indeed, the very existence of this generalized threat is what has prevented nuclear war so far. But when you realize that the threat is restricted to you and your country, while arrangements of various kinds keep all other nations free from menace, you start becoming nervous—and acting accordingly.

The slogan "the shorter the range, the deader the Germans" might sound like just another pacifistic nonsense to French, British or Americans ears. Unfortunately, however, it is very accurate in both military and strategic terms; if you don't perceive this point, you will not be able to understand the German position.

The INF agreement dictates withdrawal from Europe of all nuclear missiles with a range of between 500 and 5,000km—but does not touch shorter-range weapons (as well as, of course, the strategic arsenals of the two Superpowers). While the long-term strategic and political implications of the INF agreement are still to be properly assessed, one major point was immediately evident on, the very day the agreement was signed: it was pushing Germany into an untenable position, one likely to create a major rift within NATO.

As most shorter-range nuclear weapons are deployed along both sides of the inner German border, the INF agreement implies that German territory has been singled out as the tactical nuclear battlefield in the event of

an East-West war in Central Europe. Should these weapons be used, virtually only German civil population—both in the FRG and in the DDR—will be affected.

It should have been clearly evident that no German government, no matter what its political background, could have willingly accepted this. The INF agreement effectively deprives both German states of a coherent and credible national security policy. As regards the West, the elaborate edifice patiently built by the late Chancellor Adenauer, and which has so far allowed us to conveniently ignore the German problem and, indeed, to turn the division of Germany into the pillar of the European security policy, is crumbling like a castle of cards. It should have been only too easy to guess that West Germany, forced into a dead-end avenue, could have resorted to desperate moves—such as entering on a collision course with its main allies, and effectively siding with the Soviets in their decade-old aim to obtain a “nuclear free” Central Europe (that is, the ideal maneuver ground for the Soviet Army). Until more recently, such a move would have been unthinkable and impossible—but the current “Gorby-mania” makes things a lot easier.

The amount of pressure applied on West Germany by the British and US Governments to obtain a quick decision in favor of a new generation of shorter-range (actually, close to 480km) nuclear weapons, strikes me as showing a singular lack of political acumen and willingness to understand your ally’s problem. The fact that such weapons are actually needed (and direly so) in the overall framework of the NATO strategy, is not really relevant here; what is relevant is that nobody can expect a German government—any German government—to commit political suicide and actively back a decision which, apart from being extremely unpopular, would require a lot of mental acrobatics to be viewed as being in the ultimate interests of the German people.

The US and Great Britain (as well as France, although in a much “softer” position), have their own legitimate interests—both as leading NATO members and as nuclear powers—to insist on a quick deployment of new, shorter range nuclear weapons in Central Europe. At the risk of providing arguments to pacifists and left-wing opponents, I should, for instance, point out that the US plans to replace LANCE with a nuclear-warhead version of ATACMS [Army Tactical Missile System], serves only one purpose—namely, to make it impossible to distinguish between “normal” MLRS [Multiple Launch Rocket System]/ATACMS systems and nuclear ones, so effectively ensuring that no agreement could ever be negotiated for the limitation or withdrawal of these weapons (verification will be impossible). Which, of course, will perpetuate the role of Germany as the nuclear battlefield of choice. But nobody could expect West Germany to follow blindly, without asking too many “hows” and “whys.”

In this context, I find it rather hard to digest the hypocritical position of those commentators who raise worried eyebrows about “Germany looking towards neutrality,” “the growing German Malaise,” and so on. What were you expecting, chaps? Placing someone right in the firing line, painting a series of red circles over his heart—and then maintain that he should smile and cheer?

The INF agreement has set several time bombs along the path NATO will have to follow in the next years—and the first of these has just gone off. Now we have a couple of interesting possibilities open: somehow, force the LANCE successor down the throat of the Germans (after all, whether or not West Germany is a sovereign state is still a matter for discussion, isn’t it?)—and hence ensure an upsurge of popular hate against NATO that will never be healed; forget the whole matter—and kindly present to the Soviets, on a silver platter, something they have so far been unable to obtain through either or smiles; or—but I hardly dare put forward such an unheard-of proposition—realize that NATO needs a new overall strategy, and it needs it now.

To carry on playing with the old, worn-out tools will serve no useful purpose. Trying to ensure that Germany—just because of its geographical position and because it lost a war 45 years ago—should act as the pin-cushion for both Alliances’ nuclear arsenals, and then feigning indignation if the Germans have something to object about, will serve no useful purpose, either—and, at the same time, is not really fair.

**Admiral Schmaehling ‘Disappointed’ on NATO
Summit Decision on SNF**
*AU2906151089 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
RUNDSCHAU in German 29 Jun 89 p 4*

[Edgar Auth report: “Admiral Elmar Schmaehling—Ideas for the Bundeswehr”]

[Excerpts] According to Rear Admiral Elmar Schmaehling, the Bundeswehr is unable to reform itself on its own and adjust to the changed disarmament policy situation. During a visit to FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU, the head of the Agency for Studies and Exercises of the FRG Forces said the parties have not made a relevant contribution either. [passage omitted]

Schmaehling said he was very disappointed with the results of the recent NATO summit in Brussels. He said he did not understand the mostly positive reactions of the West German public, because the summit, instead of eliminating short-range nuclear weapons, had even laid down their necessity in an official NATO document for the first time, regardless of the conventional ratio of forces. Until then, short-range nuclear weapons had always been justified with the Warsaw Pact’s conventional superiority in Europe. Schmaehling said that in addition, the NATO statement, which was wrongly

applauded, did not state the possibility of their abolition but the decision on their deployment in 1992.

Schmaehling confirmed that he agrees with the Bundestag floor leader of the Christian Democratic Union, Alfred Dregger, on this issue. He said that it is correct that the Soviet Union cannot be hit or deterred as an aggressor by these weapons. He said these weapons represent an element in a strategic concept of the superpowers—possibly to wage war “until the last German has been killed.” Schmaehling therefore encouraged FRG security politicians to say that “as for the rest, we want the short-range nuclear weapons to be abolished,” whenever they have a chance to make a statement in the alliance.

Foreign Minister Genscher Addresses FRG-Polish Military Seminar

AU2706093889 Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG
in German 24-25 Jun 89 p 2

[“UB.” report: “Genscher: ‘Parting With Old Enemy Images’”]

[Text] Bonn—In Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher's view, today no one in the East or West can any longer ignore the “turn of the tide from confrontation to cooperation.” On Friday [23 June], the foreign minister told a German-Polish seminar on military doctrines in Ebenhausen near Munich that irreversible structures of “cooperative security” were necessary in the interest of joint responsibility for survival, which no one can ignore any longer without damaging his own interests. According to Genscher, this requires the renunciation of striving for supremacy, respect for the security interests of others, the opening up and democratization of societies, observance of human rights in accordance with the Helsinki final document, disarmament, and finally, in the event of crisis, efficient forms of universal management in order to prevent armed conflicts. The seminar in Ebenhausen, which had been prepared by the Polish International Relations Institute and the Science and Politics foundation, is also designed to be a test run for a subsequent seminar in Vienna with the participation of all the Helsinki signatories. The exchange of ideas between diplomats, officers, and scientists may play a stimulating role in the current negotiations in Vienna on conventional stability and more far-reaching confidence-building measures, the foreign minister stressed, adding that after all, one must overcome decades of fear of contact and enemy images. Genscher expressed his thanks to the Poles for the joint initiative. It is of deep symbolic importance that, 50 years after Hitler's attack, Germans and Poles have now approached one another and launched a joint initiative of dialogue and confidence-building that goes beyond the blocks, he said. Bonn and Warsaw are thus responding to their responsibilities of the 1970 Warsaw Treaty, namely “to consolidate peace and security in Europe.”

In his speech, the foreign minister referred several times to the FRG-USSR statement issued on the occasion of Gorbachev's visit to Bonn, which also expressed a new thinking in terms of security policy and stressed that, in the long run, one is aiming at a new cooperative security structure. With the help of drastic cuts in military potentials and restructuring, a dominant defensive character must be achieved on both sides so that strategic offensive operations no longer have any chance and defense capability is guaranteed. One must part with old patterns of thought, outdated enemy images, and worn-out patterns of conducting international affairs.

The foreign minister mentioned the aura and fascination of the EC as an open and dynamic community that is increasingly becoming the heart of an all-European state of peace. The restructuring in Central and Eastern Europe is also an expression of a European attitude. The objective of a permanent and fair all-European state of peace is coming within our reach, Genscher said. It is to be welcomed that fewer and fewer governments are behaving like “the ugly girl who smashes the mirror, blaming it for her looks—to use an image of Vaclav Havel's, the great Czech playwright and human rights activist.”

SPD's Ehmke, Poland's Wojna View Relations

Document on Nuclear-Free Baltic, CSBMs
AU2706131989 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network
in German 1100 GMT 27 Jun 89

[Dieter Kopp report from Bonn]

[Text] The Bonn Social Democratic Party [SPD] has maintained regular contacts with the Socialist Unity Party of Germany as well as with the Polish United Workers Party [PZPR]. In doing so, they discuss human rights, disarmament problems, and other things. A new round of talks was held with the PZPR in Bonn just now, and the results were made public at a news conference today [27 June]. Dieter Kopp has a report:

Ryszard Wojna had come to Bonn to discuss confidence-building measures and disarmament in the Baltic Sea at an SPD-PZPR meeting. But when he met the press in Bonn at noon together with Horst Ehmke, the journalists were more interested in the state of German-Polish relations and the chances of a visit by the chancellor to Warsaw soon. However, one day following the unproductive talks between the special commissioners, Teltschik and Kucza, Wojna did not have any new details, but expressed optimism about the installment of a Polish leadership soon. Judging by his statements, there will be no lack of competent partners to talk to in Warsaw.

[Begin Wojna recording in German] I expect the new parliament to elect a new president and a new prime minister very soon, because—as you know—President Bush will be visiting Warsaw on 9 July. As for the whole

government, I think that the new prime minister will need some time to form a government. [end recording]

So Bush will come to Poland, and even French President Mitterrand was in Poland for political talks between two elections. Wojna believes, however, that a visit by Helmut Kohl to Warsaw will only make sense if substantive results can be achieved.

[Begin Wojna recording in German] However, I share Chancellor Kohl's view that his visit to Poland should lead to a breakthrough. If the conditions for such a breakthrough, or change, are not ripe it would possibly be better to continue negotiations to achieve better results. [end recording]

Horst Ehmke of the Social Democrats said that he was sorry that the Federal Republic risked being at the end of a process, instead of setting the pace.

In the first part of their news conference, Ehmke and Wojna, who are co-chairmen of the SPD-PZPR joint work group, presented a joint document on confidence-building measures and arms control in the Baltic Sea, which will open up new ground, as they said.

In this document, they demand a step-by-step reduction in and total removal of nuclear weapons deployed in the Baltic Sea. They agree that the navies must be included more in the process of detente and disarmament. They suggest as initial practical steps decreasing naval maneuvers in the Baltic Sea, banning them in areas abundant with fish, as well as heavily navigated areas, and mutually announcing exercises in advance.

Urge Naval Disarmament

LD2706152589 Hamburg DPA in German 1018 GMT
27 Jun 89

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—The German Social Democrats [SPD] and the Polish communists have called for a gradual reduction in nuclear weapons in the Baltic Sea with the final objective of their total elimination. In a paper of the joint working group of the SPD and the Polish United Workers Party [PZPR] published in Bonn on Tuesday, the reduction of naval maneuvers, their ban from fishing and busy areas, as well as reciprocal announcements and the exchange of information on such exercises is presented as a first step.

In the view of the two parties, in the system of defensive military structures between East and West there no longer exists any need for naval landing forces in the Baltic Sea. Therefore, NATO, in reply to the Soviet offer of unilateral reduction of these forces, should reduce its own naval units.

The chairmen of the working group, SPD politician Horst Ehmke, and Ryszard Wojna for the Polish side, concurred before newsmen in Bonn that "new territory" was being entered with the paper. The naval forces, too,

should be included more than before in the process of detente and disarmament. According to Wojna, this "common denominator" with the SPD on security issues should be a hopeful sign for all those who believe that the division of Europe can be overcome. A united Europe is also part of Polish state policy.

Firm Aided Sale of Chemicals for Weapons to Iran

U.S. Reports Cited

LD2706130989 Hamburg DPA in German 1238 GMT
27 Jun 89

[Excerpt] Bonn (DPA)—According to the U.S. Administration, an FRG firm arranged the sale to Iran of "significant amounts of chemicals." It was suspected that this material would be used for the production of chemicals weapons in Iran, the LOS ANGELES TIMES reported. In answer to an inquiry, the Federal Economics Ministry in Bonn confirmed on Tuesday that the Foreign Ministry had received from Washington more concrete information about an illegal transfer deal involving chemicals that also could be used for chemical weapons.

Reliable sources said that an Iranian diplomat was withdrawn from Iran's Embassy at the federal government's request because of the deal. The diplomat had acted as an embassy attache since 1987. The name mentioned by the LOS ANGELES TIMES, "Kharim Ali Sobhani," was correct. [passage omitted]

Export Deal Cancelled

LD2806184589 Hamburg DPA in German 1719 GMT
28 Jun 89

[Excerpts] Duesseldorf (DPA)—The Duesseldorf Rheineisen Chemical Products Company wants to supply Iran with 257 tons of thionylchloride, worth \$360 thousand, which can be used for, among other purposes, the production of poison gas. Two of the company's lawyers confirmed this evening the connections revealed by the U.S. secret service, which U.S. Secretary of State James Baker had spoken of to Federal Foreign Minister Genscher in person last week.

According to the lawyers, the Rheineisen firm, which is owned by an Iranian family, wanted to transport the chemicals from India and Iran, via Dubai. However, the deal was cancelled this morning after the Duesseldorf customs investigation department searched the business premises yesterday, the lawyers reported. [passage omitted]

Export of the multipurpose raw material from the Federal Republic requires official approval, according to a report from State Secretary of Finance Manfred Carstens. Thionylchloride was added to the Export List in April. The setting-up of deals of this kind has been a punishable offence in the FRG since 8 March—even if

the firm has bought and resold the export goods [outside of FRG territory]. Thus, they need not have touched German soil.

According to newspaper reports, the key figure in the deal was an attache of the Iranian Embassy in Bonn. The diplomat was recalled to Iran 4 weeks ago. There is at present an examination in Duesseldorf of whether this is a punishable mediating operation or a nonpunishable broker's operation, government spokesman Herbert Schmuelling reported. The firm in question had not made any application for approval of a mediating or third-country operation to the Federal Office of Trade.

Minister Says 'Loophole' To Be Corrected
*LD2906115189 Hamburg DPA in German 1025 GMT
29 Jun 89*

[Text] Hamburg (DPA)—Federal Economics Minister Helmut Haussmann (Free Democratic Party), hopes, in light of the case of the Dusseldorf Rheineisen Chemical Products Company, to close any loopholes that have become apparent in the planned new foreign trade law. Haussmann, in an interview with Saarland Radio today, said that corrections of this nature are possible in further discussions of the law. Rheineisen lawyers yesterday confirmed the planned supply to Iran of 257 tons of thionylchloride, which can be used for the production of poison gas. The connections with the firm, which is owned by an Iranian family, were revealed by the U.S. secret service, and Federal German authorities were informed.

"In the future we will be able to discover such occurrences, punish those guilty, and keep them away from the Federal Republic as a deterrent," Haussmann said. It is the intention of the legislature to make even the so-called third-country trade of certain goods a punishable offence. However, the best German controls are of no use if many other countries are not prepared to

cooperate, the economics minister said. The Rheineisen company had hoped to forward the chemicals from India to Iran, via Dubai.

Iran Denies Manufacturing Plans

*LD3006093489 Tehran IRNA in English 0905 GMT
30 Jun 89*

[Text] Tehran, June 30, IRNA—A spokesman for the Foreign Ministry Thursday categorically denied reports on Iran's intention to purchase chemical materials for manufacture of chemical weapons.

The spokesman said the claims, originated by U.S. officials and media and trumpeted by European mass media, were "false, biased and followed particular political and propaganda goals."

He also strongly denied rumours that an Iranian diplomat had been summoned by the Bonn government in connection with the charges, and said the diplomat's mission had ended more than a month ago and he had returned to Tehran.

Referring to Washington's close and old cooperation with Baghdad as well as the role certain European states played in supplying chemical weapons to Iraq, and especially taking into regard the new U.S. policy to approach the Baghdad regime, he said such rumours were in line with Washington's open hostility towards the Islamic Republic.

They also aimed at deviating the world public opinion from the Iraqi regime's brutal crimes in chemically bombarding its own Kurdish population as well as its recent efforts to evict Iraqi Kurds from their homeland, the spokesman said.

In March 1988, the Iraqi regime massacred over 5,000 Kurdish inhabitants and maimed a similar number in the town of Halabjah, by using chemical weapons. The tragedy was described as the most horrid crime of the century.

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